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Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the
Populist Fourth Amendment
Avidan Y. Cover 
ABSTRACT: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence currently leaves it to
technology corporations to challenge court orders, subpoenas, and requests by
the government for individual users’ information. The third-party doctrine
denies people a reasonable expectation of privacy in data they transmit
through telecommunications and Internet service providers. Third-party
corporations become, by default, the people’s corporate avatars. Corporate
avatars, however, do a poor job of representing individuals’ interests.
Moreover, vesting the Fourth Amendment’s government oversight functions
in corporations fails to cohere with the Bill of Rights’ populist history and the
Framers’ distrust of corporations.
This Article examines how the third-party doctrine proves unsupportable in
the big data surveillance era, in which communicating and sharing
information through third parties’ technology is a necessary condition of
existence, and non-content data, such as Internet subscriber information or
cell site location information, provides an intimate portrait of a person’s
activities and beliefs. Recognizing the potential for excessive government
surveillance, scholars, courts, and Congress have endorsed corporations as
one solution to Executive branch overreach and privacy invasion.
This Article demonstrates through both government and corporate reports that
companies have rarely challenged government requests for their users’ data.
Incentives to cooperate with government surveillance, including highly
profitable relationships with government, government regulation of
companies, and statutory immunity, make it unlikely that corporations will
ever be adequate avatars. This Article further documents how expansive
search powers originated in England with the aid of private industry, making
corporations dubious guardians of the Fourth Amendment.
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This Article offers three practicable solutions to increase individual agency.
First, the third-party doctrine should be limited in order to permit an
expectation of privacy in some non-content data. Second, Congress should
enact proprietary rights in certain personal data. Finally, technological
advances should facilitate individuals’ selection of corporations’ services and
devices that ensure notice of government surveillance and enable direct
communication between the people and government over searches and
seizures.
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INTRODUCTION

We live in a surveillance state founded on a partnership between
government and the technology industry.1 Edward Snowden’s revelations that
law enforcement and intelligence agencies have obtained communications
and phone and email records of Internet providers’ users cement this reality.2
A key feature of the surveillance state is the cooperative relationship
between the private sector and the government. The private sector’s role is
vital to the surveillance both practically and legally. The private sector, of
course, provides the infrastructure and tools for the surveillance. It is through
the communications on smartphones built by Apple or the videos hosted by
YouTube that the government obtains data. Surveillance is further facilitated
by arrangements between the government and companies, such as built-in
backdoors and informal agreements.
The private sector is also critical to the surveillance state’s legality. Under
the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the
government acquires information that people provide to corporations,
because they voluntarily provide their information to another entity and
assume the risk that the entity will disclose the information to the
government. Therefore, people do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their calling data, or potentially even their emails. As a result, the
government does not normally need a warrant to obtain information
transmitted electronically.
But the Fourth Amendment is not only a source of protection for
individual privacy; it also limits government excess and abuse through
challenges by the people. The third-party doctrine removes this vital and
populist check on government overreach.
The unsatisfying answer to this constitutional dilemma has been what I
describe as the “corporate avatar dynamic.” In Internet parlance, avatars refer
to characters that represent users in venues as diverse as online games,
communities, and discussion groups.3 But whatever form the avatar takes, the
user controls the avatar. In response to critics of surveillance and the third1. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1,
6–9 (2008).
2. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secretprogram/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html; Glenn Greenwald,
NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. Just
weeks earlier, it was revealed that Verizon acquiesced to government subpoenas of Associated Press
reporters’ phone data. See Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Justice Dept. Defends Seizure of Phone Records,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/us/politics/attorney-generaldefends-seizure-of-journalists-phone-records.html.
3. See Avatar, TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/avatar (last visited
Mar. 6, 2015).
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party doctrine, apologists argue that even if someone does not have a privacy
interest in a phone call or Internet data, the third party—Facebook, Sprint,
or Twitter—may act as our avatar: The company can assert claims against
searches, standing in the shoes of the person.4 In a similar vein, Congress
enacted laws permitting communications providers to challenge directives
concerning assistance with government surveillance on their own behalf and
on behalf of their subscribers.5 And courts have upheld the right of third-party
service providers to challenge government requests for information on their
customers’ behalf, with the Supreme Court indicating these challenges fulfill
the government-checking purposes of the Fourth Amendment.6
Concerned that the forces of government and commerce rule
cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig asks: “How do we protect liberty when the
architectures of control are managed as much by the government as by the
private sector?”7 Making corporate avatars the primary means of challenging
government searches on behalf of people inadequately responds to Lessig’s
concern.
This Article diagnoses and solves the problem of corporate avatars.
Corporations are poor avatars for people. They cannot serve a governmentchecking function when they have vested interests in cooperating with the
government. Moreover, maintaining the Fourth Amendment’s governmentchecking function in corporate avatars runs counter to the Framers’ distrust
of powerful corporations.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief overview of the
third-party doctrine and its application to big data. Part III describes the
corporate avatar dynamic. Part IV addresses corporate avatars’ limitations and
shows few instances of corporate challenges to government requests for user
data. Part V shows how technology corporations are not likely to challenge
government surveillance requests, and even less likely to make effective
arguments asserting their individual customers’ rights, because of their
government connections, the legal constraints on transparency and
disclosure, and their immunity for complying with the government. Part V
also explains how the objectives of a populist Fourth Amendment are
undermined by the substitution of corporations for the people. Part VI
recommends notice to the user as the primary mechanism for returning to a
populist Fourth Amendment that properly limits government overreach. The
theoretical underpinnings for a notice regime require reconceiving people’s
relationship to data as a proprietary one and limiting the third-party doctrine.
The Article concludes by proposing a “machine-to-machine mechanism” by
which peoples’ privacy and notice preferences are communicated to both the

4.
5.
6.
7.

See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 598–600 (2009).
See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4), (6) (2012).
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154–55 (2013).
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at xv (2006).
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tech companies and the government, thereby encouraging corporate
enforcement of privacy and deterring government overreach.
II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AND BIG DATA
The third-party doctrine comes from conceiving absolute secrecy to be
the bedrock of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. That narrow view of
privacy, however, is increasingly untenable in an era in which virtually all
personal information is disclosed to third parties. The doctrine is also
predicated on the conceit that individuals voluntarily share their information
with third parties—even though disclosing personal information is a necessary
part of today’s society. Consequently, individuals’ shared data do not receive
Fourth Amendment protection against government surveillance.
A. ORIGINS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
For our purposes, the critical, early third-party doctrine cases are United
States v. Miller8 and Smith v. Maryland.9 These cases build on earlier case law,
which held that words spoken to an informant receive no Fourth Amendment
protection.10
In Miller, the Supreme Court upheld a whiskey distiller’s conviction for
unpaid taxes based, in part, on subpoenaed bank records, which were
obtained without a court order or notice to the distiller.11 The Court held that
Miller had no Fourth Amendment interest in his bank records.12 He did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the records because they were “not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions.”13 Moreover, the majority reasoned, Miller
“voluntarily conveyed [the information] to the banks and exposed [it] to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.”14 The Court explained that
Miller had assumed the risk that the bank would give his account records to
8. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
9. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
10. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750–51 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 300–03 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). Eleven states have not
embraced the third-party doctrine. State courts often interpret their state constitutions to afford
privacy to information transmitted to third parties. See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All
Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information
from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395–99 & nn.118–28 (2006) (cataloguing states
and their case law rejecting federal third-party doctrine); see also, e.g., State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d
866, 873 (N.J. 2005) (holding that the New Jersey state constitution affords privacy expectations
in bank records); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956–57 (N.J. 1982) (holding that telephone
number records are entitled to the state constitution’s privacy protections). Henderson identifies
another ten states, which he believes might reject the third-party doctrine. See Henderson, supra,
at 400–05 & nn.129–38.
11. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–39.
12. Id. at 440.
13. Id. at 442.
14. Id.
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the government when he deposited money there.15 Moreover, the Court held,
Miller did not need to receive notice of the subpoenas.16
In Smith, the Court upheld a robbery conviction that was based on a pen
register of phone numbers the defendant had dialed.17 The police did not
obtain a warrant or court order but simply asked the phone company to install
the pen register.18 The Court held that this was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment, and therefore, did not require a warrant.19
The Court distinguished Katz v. United States, in which it held that it was
a search when the government attached a listening device to a phone booth
to monitor people’s conversations.20 Unlike the instrument in Katz, “pen
registers do not acquire the contents of communications.”21 The Court
expressed “doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial.”22 The Court observed that people must
know they are providing the numbers to the phone company and that the
phone company records these numbers.23
But even if the person had held a subjective expectation of privacy in the
phone numbers he dialed, the third-party doctrine meant that society did not
recognize this expectation as reasonable. Citing the informant cases and
Miller, the Court explained that “a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”24 By using
the phone, a person “assume[s] the risk that the company would reveal to
police the numbers he dialed.”25 Holding that the defendant could not have
harbored a legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, the
Court held the installation and use of the pen register was not a search and
did not require a warrant.26 Miller and Smith are powerful precedents and have
diminished individual privacy in the big data era.
B. BIG DATA
“Big data” describes both the massive quantity of information about
people’s communications and behavior, and the range of analysis that can be
15. Id. at 443.
16. Id. at 443 & n.5.
17. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 745–46 (1979). A pen register records the phone
numbers dialed but does not capture the content of communications. See id. at 736 n.1.
18. Id. at 737.
19. Id. at 745–46.
20. Id. at 739–40 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
21. Id. at 741 (emphasis omitted).
22. Id. at 742.
23. Id. at 742–43. The Court acknowledged “subjective expectations cannot be scientifically
gauged,” but was incredulous that phone users could believe the number they dial would be
secret. Id. at 743.
24. Id. at 743–44.
25. Id. at 744.
26. Id. at 745–46.
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applied to the information, from which conclusions are drawn.27 The big data
era has come about through “digitization,” which entails “making analog
information readable by computers, which also makes it easier and cheaper
to store and process.”28 Big data’s vast array of communications includes
“large, diverse, complex, longitudinal, and/or distributed data sets generated
from instruments, sensors, Internet transactions, email, video, click streams,
and/or all other digital sources available today and in the future.”29 Big data
is also historical and essentially permanent.30
Digital data double almost every three years.31 The quantity of data today
amounts to each person on the globe having 320 times the information
thought to have been held in the great Library of Alexandria.32 The size of
the data sets permits the signature definitional aspect of big data—inferences
and predictions about individuals’ behavior, be it shopping, voting, or
breaking the law.33
Technology companies’ primary product is their users’ personal
information.34 Big data permits personalizing information and services.35 But
individualized products and advertising require the person to share personal

27. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, at ix (2014), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_
2014.pdf.
28. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 15 (2013).
29. NAT’L SCI. FOUND. & NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, CORE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES
FOR ADVANCING BIG DATA SCIENCE & ENGINEERING (BIG DATA) 5 (2012), available at http://
www.nsf.gov/pubs/2012/nsf12499/nsf12499.pdf.
30. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 40 (“[D]ata,
once created, are permanent. . . . [T]heir continued existence is best considered conservatively as
unalterable fact.”); ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE
FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 55 (2013) (“Near-permanent data storage will have a
big impact on how citizens operate in virtual space. There will be a record of all activity and
associations online, and everything added to the Internet will become part of a repository of
permanent information.”).
31. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 28, at 9.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 12 (“[I]t’s about applying math to huge quantities of data in order to infer
probabilities . . . .”); id. at 55 (“Predictions based on correlations lie at the heart of big data.”);
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 2.
34. See ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 6 (2011)
(“You’re getting a free service, and the cost is information about you. And Google and Facebook
translate that pretty directly into money.” (quoting Chris Palmer of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35. SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 30, at 23 (describing personalization as the “key advance
ahead”); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD
WORRY) 183–84 (2011). See generally PARISER, supra note 34.
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information, and lots of it.36 There is, as Yahoo! CEO Marissa Mayer and
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito have separately observed, a trade-off.37
We certainly benefit from big data. Amazon recognizes profiles of users
when they log on and recommends books based on their shopping history.
When those users turn to the Washington Post, ads for products that they
browsed on another site show up next to news articles.38 Google searches for
the flu provide health authorities’ real-time information about an epidemic
outbreak.39
But big data has its drawbacks. Target stores can determine through data
analytics that a customer’s shopping selections indicate she is pregnant—a
conclusion the store can reach even before anyone else knows.40 Searches and
shopping patterns might affect consumers’ mortgage rates and price quotes.41
And the third-party doctrine allows the government to access these data—
both the raw information and analyses of users’ data. The Supreme Court has
recently expressed concerns that government access to big data may violate
the Fourth Amendment.42
In United States v. Jones, the Court struck down the warrantless use of a
global positioning satellite (“GPS”) device to track a criminal suspect’s car.43
Though ultimately decided on trespass grounds, the long-term GPS
surveillance raised questions for a majority of the Justices about what
36. See PARISER, supra note 34, at 16 (“Personalization is based on a bargain. In exchange
for the service of filtering, you hand large companies an enormous amount of data about your
daily life—much of which you might not trust friends with.”).
37. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 35, at 87 (“In all cases it’s a trade-off, right, where you will
give up some of your privacy in order to gain some functionality, and so we really need to make
those trade-offs really clear to people, what information are we using and what’s the benefit to
them, and then ultimately leave it to user choice.” (quoting former Google vice-president Marissa
Mayer) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“New technology may provide increased convenience or security
at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”).
38. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 11–13 (listing
examples of current and future applications of big data).
39. JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 110 (2013) (describing the analysis of Google
word searches to determine flu virus hotspots in real time); MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra
note 28, at 1–2 (describing the same, specifically for the H1N1 virus).
40. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
41. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG DATA: A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER
CREDIT RISK 27–28 (2014), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-bigdata.pdf.
42. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–95 (2014) (holding unconstitutional
the warrantless search of a cell phone incident to an arrest due, in part, to the cell phone’s vast
storage capacity, its historical record of data, the variety of data it may hold, and its widespread
usage); City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“Cell phone and text message
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or
necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case
for an expectation of privacy.”).
43. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49 (2012).
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surveillance the Fourth Amendment countenances.44 Justice Sonia Sotomayor
questioned the continuing validity of the third-party doctrine in light of big
data.45 She expressed “doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had
visited in the last week, or month, or year.”46 Until the doctrine’s demise,
however, law enforcement and intelligence agencies can access the personal
information in big data, often without a warrant and its attendant protections
of the probable cause standard and independent judicial review, upsetting the
Fourth Amendment’s purposes of democratic accountability and limited
powers of government.47
C. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN THE BIG DATA ERA
The Internet has not changed the third-party doctrine and its assumption
of the risk rationale.48 As one lower court phrased it, “voluntary disclosure” is
“built directly into the architecture of the Internet,” leading to a loss of users’
Fourth Amendment protection.49 The following Subparts discuss how courts
apply the doctrine to various data.
1. Internet Subscriber Information
Federal courts generally agree that people have no expectation of privacy
in the subscriber information they submit to an Internet service provider

44. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[L]onger term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”); see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(quoting Justice Alito’s concurrence).
45. Id. at 957 (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976))).
46. Id.; see also id. at 956 (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).
47. See id. at 956 (noting “the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police
power to and prevent a too permeating police surveillance” (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 595 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (D. Md. 2012) (noting that
“courts have extended the third-party doctrine to . . . inter alia, credit card statements, electric
utility records, motel registration records, and employment records” (citing United States v.
Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21,
2008))).
49. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp.
2d 114, 133 (E.D. Va. 2011).
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(“ISP”).50 Courts often analogize names, email addresses, and websites visited
to phone numbers obtained via a pen register.51
In United States v. Forrester, for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that computer surveillance was
“constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the
Court approved in Smith.”52 Analogizing to Smith, the court determined that
“e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from
addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit
because they should know that this information is provided to and used by
[ISPs] for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”53
Moreover, the court reasoned, users voluntarily turn over the data to servers.54
2. Cell Site Location Information
The majority of federal courts have held that the third-party doctrine
applies to cell site location information (“CSLI”).55 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, determined that CSLI fell within
the third-party doctrine because “[t]he cell service provider collects and stores
historical cell site data for its own business purposes.”56 It does not obtain the
information at the government’s behest.57

50. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases);
see also United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2010); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611
F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010);
Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2001). State courts that do not endorse the thirdparty doctrine, however, have held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
Internet subscriber information they convey to third-party providers. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 945
A.2d 26, 28 (N.J. 2008).
51. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007).
52. Id. at 510.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012) (collecting
cases); United States v. Benford, No. 2:09-CR-86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26,
2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008). Some of these same courts have, however, acknowledged that the use
of cell tower triangulation to determine the precise location of people in private locations could
implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *11. The
Supreme Court’s finding in Riley v. California, that CSLI implicates privacy concerns, is already
affecting some lower courts’ analyses. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490, 2492 (2014).
Compare Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 524–26 (Fla. 2014) (relying, in part, on Riley in holding
that the use of CSLI to track individuals constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment), with
United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that CSLI does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment and that “Riley does not unequivocally overrule” the Fifth
Circuit’s CSLI precedent in In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d
600 (5th Cir. 2013)), and United States v. Martinez, No. 13CR3560-WQH, 2014 WL 5480686, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (rejecting the application of Riley to CSLI).
56. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 611.
57. Id. at 612.
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The Fifth Circuit found that, because users know that the information is
provided based on the company’s disclosure policies, they provided their
CSLI information voluntarily.58 The court contended that users could have
chosen a cell phone provider that does not retain CSLI, or chosen not to make
the call.59
Some federal courts, however, do not apply the third-party doctrine to
CSLI. When the government applied for a court order under the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”),60 which would have required a cellular phone
provider to disclose a customer’s CSLI, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit distinguished the cell phone customer’s relationship to the
cellular phone company from the relationships in Smith and Miller.61 In
contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the court determined that the customer had not
voluntarily shared his CSLI because customers do not know their CSLI is
collected and stored.62
Perhaps more important to the Third Circuit, cell phone carriers can
locate phones within 50 meters of a call.63 One district court similarly held
that the third-party doctrine should not apply to cumulative CLSI because it
constituted surveillance of “movements over a considerable time period.”64
This level of detail would, according to Judge Nicholas Garaufis, “implicate
sufficiently serious protected privacy concerns” similar to those involved with
the content of email communications.65
Courts that resist applying the third-party doctrine to CSLI tend to focus
on the nature of the privacy intrusion presented by prolonged and pervasive
surveillance conducted through acquisition of CSLI, rather than parsing the
voluntariness of the disclosure.66 As Judge Garaufis explained, “there are

58. Id. at 613; see also Guerrero, 768 F.3d at 358–59 (relying on In re Application of the U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 612–13, 615).
59. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613.
60. Stored Communications Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
61. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv.
to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v.
Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
62. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 317–18.
63. Id. at 318.
64. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). In this case, the cell-phone-located records
covered “at least 113 days.” Id. at 114, 118, 127.
65. Id. at 126.
66. See id. at 117–19, 126 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–68 (D.C. Cir.
2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)); In re Application of the U.S.
for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 844 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600
(5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585–89, 592–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, No. 10-MC-0550
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010).
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circumstances in which the legal interest being protected from government
intrusion trumps any actual belief that it will remain private.”67
3. Email Contents
Unlike Internet subscriber information, courts are more inclined to hold
that Internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their emails.
In United States v. Warshak, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that an Internet user has “a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received
through a commercial ISP.”68 Therefore, the court held, “[t]he government
may not compel” access to the email “without first obtaining a warrant.”69 As
a result, the court held that the portions of the SCA that permitted the
warrantless collection of email were unconstitutional.70
In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit first found that Warshak had an actual
expectation of privacy in the contents of his email because they contained his
“entire business and personal life.”71 The court contrasted the “confidential
communications” in Warshak’s emails with the “simple business records” in
Miller.72 The court also stressed that the bank was the intended recipient of
the records while the ISP was an “intermediary.”73
The court then considered whether the expectation of privacy in email
communications is a reasonable one. Noting the “prominent role that email
has assumed in modern communication,” the court observed that email
“provides an account of its owner’s life.”74 As a result, access to a person’s
email gives the government “the ability to peer deeply into his activities.”75
Thus, the court held, the Fourth Amendment was implicated, rendering the
SCA’s lack of a warrant requirement for collecting email unconstitutional.76

67. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809
F. Supp. 2d at 124.
68. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warshak v. United
States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(f) (2012). The ISP provided the government with over
27,000 emails. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283. Warshak received notice of the ex parte order and
subpoena more than a year later. See id.
71. Id. at 284 (quoting Brief of Appellants Steven Warshak, Harriet Warshak, and TCI
Media, Inc. at 40, Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (No. 08-3997), 2009 WL 1581797) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
72. Id. at 288 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442 (1976)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 284.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 288.
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4. Telephony Metadata
Applicability of the third-party doctrine explains lower courts’ differing
judgments on the constitutionality of the government’s bulk telephony
metadata collection under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to authorize the
government to seek orders “requiring the production of any tangible things”
in connection with foreign intelligence surveillance and investigations.77 The
law also removed restrictions on the types of businesses that could be served
and the requirement that the surveillance target be a foreign power or its
agent.78
Pursuant to section 215, the government has asserted its authority since
May 2006 to obtain classified ex parte orders from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) directing telecommunications service providers
to provide the National Security Agency (“NSA”) with the telephony metadata
of all calls dialed within the United States.79 “Telephony metadata” includes
all calls’ “originating and terminating telephone number, International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc., trunk identifier, telephone calling
card numbers, and time and duration of call.”80 It “does not include the
substantive content of any communication . . . or the name, address, or
financial information of a subscriber.”81
The majority of courts have found that the telephony metadata program
does not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy. Relying on Smith, they have
77. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215,
115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1862 (2012)).
78. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also infra text accompanying note 131.
79. See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod.
of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc.,
No. BR-13-80, slip op. at 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013); see also Siobhan Gorman et al., U.S. Collects
Vast Data Trove: NSA Monitoring Includes Three Major Phone Companies, as Well as Online Activity, WALL
ST. J. (June 7, 2013, 9:25 AM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324299
104578529112289298922 (stating that AT&T and Sprint have been receiving similar FISA orders
for seven years); Lara Jakes, FISA Court Approves Continued U.S. Phone Surveillance, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 18, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/fisa-court-approvessurveillance_n_3625610.html (reporting on the renewal of Verizon’s FISA order).
80. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc., No. BR-13-80, slip
op. at 2 (internal parentheses omitted).
81. Id. Comprehensive descriptions of the metadata collection program may be found in
THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD 79–129 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf; see also PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT
ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 21–36
(2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_
Program-2.pdf.
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held that the metadata are “voluntarily” conveyed to the third-party
telecommunications provider.82 Some of the courts noted that “what
metadata is has not changed,” and that the increased volume of collected
metadata has no constitutional significance.83
However, Judge Richard Leon distinguished the NSA bulk telephony
metadata program from the pen register in Smith.84 Judge Leon noted four
significant differences between Smith and the NSA program. First, unlike the
13-day operation of the pen register in Smith, the metadata program captured
data over the course of more than five years.85 Second, unlike the relationship
between the police and the third party in Smith, the phone company and the
government functioned as “a joint intelligence-gathering operation.”86 Third,
the bulk telephony metadata program’s technological capabilities far exceed
the pen register, rendering Smith largely irrelevant as a precedent.87 Finally,
Judge Leon found that the increase in phone ownership and usage enables
the government to obtain more data and details about peoples’ lives, leading
to a greater expectation of privacy that society should consider reasonable.88
But Judge Leon’s opinion is the outlier.
The continuing acceptance of the third-party doctrine raises questions
about whether the government-limiting objectives of the Fourth Amendment
can be realized in the big data era. Because an individual doesn’t have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information conveyed through the third
party, she has no Fourth Amendment right to assert. In addition, the
individual is rarely provided notice of the request for information or the fact
that it is shared with the government. Thus, it is usually left to the tech
corporation to resist government requests for users’ data.

82. See Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1007 (D. Idaho 2014); Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); United States v. Moalin, No.
10cr4246-JM, 2013 WL 6079518, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013); In re Application of the Fed.
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01, slip
op. at 11–12 (FISA Ct. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-158, slip op. at 4–6
(FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013); In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at
*2–3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
83. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Application of the Fed.
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01, slip op. at
19–20; In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *3.
84. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32–37.
85. Id. at 32.
86. Id. at 33.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 33–36.

A3_COVER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1456

4/13/2015 2:33 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1441

III. THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC
This Part describes the corporate avatar dynamic. Defenders of the thirdparty doctrine argue that even if an individual cannot challenge certain
electronic surveillance, the electronic communications providers may assert
the individual’s privacy rights and keep the government in check. Thus, the
corporation—the third party—becomes the individual’s avatar.
A. THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Orin Kerr argues that third parties that hold customer information can
help limit the threat to civil liberties posed by the third-party doctrine by
asserting their own rights and that of their customers.89 When the customer’s
privacy interests and the business’s financial interests align, the third-party
business has a clear incentive to challenge government requests for customer
information.90 Thus, Kerr concludes, even without Fourth Amendment
protection due to the third-party doctrine, the possibility that third-party
businesses will fight the requests may deter government overreach.91
To be sure, there are cases in which third parties challenge subpoenas
seeking their customers’ business records. In addition, tech companies have
challenged a small number of government requests for user data in the
criminal and national security context.92 Although these instances of
corporate resistance appear more anomalous than the norm, tech companies

89. Kerr does not argue that service providers should be the primary means by which
government searches are challenged. Rather, he contends that such challenges are one of several
ways in which the third-party doctrine may be limited. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 595–600. Kerr
identifies other alternative privacy protections for records shared with third parties, including
statutes and common law privileges, such as attorney-client privilege. Id. at 596–98. I question
the efficacy of these protections, however, because of the statutes’ inadequate notice to
individuals and incentives for service provider cooperation with the government, and the limited
instances in which common law privileges may apply. Jon Michaels has also proposed that, in the
intelligence context, corporations should be legally compelled to play a gatekeeping function,
requiring the Executive branch to comply with all legal requirements, such as warrants or
subpoenas, before providing information. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 950–52 (2008). Michaels,
however, claims that his proposal does not address information falling under the third-party
doctrine. See id. at 952 n.222. But his insertion of the private sector into a government-checking
role raises the same concerns as the corporate avatar dynamic. See infra Part V.
90. Kerr, supra note 4, at 598. In addition to financial incentives that may prompt Internet
companies to seek the protection of user privacy, some see a “libertarian streak” in Internet
companies that predisposes them to resist data requests on their users’ behalf. See Claire Cain
Miller, Secret Court Ruling Put Tech Companies in Data Bind, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/technology/secret-court-ruling-put-tech-companies-indata-bind.html.
91. Kerr, supra note 4, at 600. Kerr does not argue companies will always fight government
requests for information. But he maintains that the frequent alignment of customers’ privacy
interests and businesses’ financial interests will be “a substantial deterrence” of government
excess. See id.
92. See infra Part IV.A.
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have increased their opposition to government requests for user data since
the Snowden leaks.93 But the companies’ own interests—not the customer’s
rights—motivate this opposition. That distinction may mean arguments come
less frequently, and take on a different form and scope.94 In addition, the cases
demonstrate diverse corporate responses to government requests for user
data—from cooperation to negotiation to litigation.95
B. JUDICIAL DISCUSSION OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC
Courts also have embraced the corporate avatar dynamic. At first glance,
this may be seen as buttressing individual rights, because it guards against
government overreaching made possible by the third-party doctrine. But
courts readily identify the providers’ capacity, and their failure, to challenge
searches as evidence that the search is legitimate. This ignores the many
factors that explain why commercial providers rarely oppose government
searches. Thus, judicial acceptance of the corporate avatar dynamic is a
pyrrhic victory at best for individual rights.
In In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(“FISCR”) held that an amendment to FISA granted service providers a cause
of action to include claims for their customers’ Fourth Amendment
violations.96 The service provider, now identified as Yahoo!,97 had refused to
comply with a directive requiring it to assist in warrantless surveillance of its
customers.98
The court held that Yahoo! met the constitutional requirements of
standing because it would sustain an injury by having “to facilitate the
government’s surveillances of its customers . . . caused by the government
through the directives,” which could be redressed by the court.99 The court
found that Congress’s explicit provision of a right to challenge the legal
directive overcame the prudential limitation on standing for asserting the
rights of third parties.100 Accordingly, Yahoo! could bring a “Fourth

93. See infra Parts IV.A, V.B.
94. See infra Part IV.C.
95. See infra Part IV.
96. In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); see also Protect America Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 552, 554, repealed by FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, § 403(a)(1)(A), 122 Stat. 2436, 2473 (2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a(a), (c)(2) (2012)) (providing that a service provider that receives a directive “may
challenge the legality of that directive”).
97. Miller, supra note 90.
98. In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3d at 1007–08.
99. Id. at 1008.
100. Id. at 1008–09.
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Amendment claim on behalf of its customers.”101 The court ultimately ruled,
however, that the warrantless surveillance did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.102
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court invoked the
corporate avatar dynamic as a partial basis to deny standing to individual
plaintiffs who sought to challenge government surveillance under section 702
of FISA.103 The plaintiff reporters, lawyers, and human rights advocates
claimed section 702 violated their Fourth Amendment rights because it
authorized surveillance without a showing of probable cause that the target
was a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and did not require the
government to identify the nature and location of the surveillance.104 The
Court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claims were
speculative and any harm they sustained by trying to avoid being overheard
was of their own making.105
Responding to contentions that its holding would “insulate the
government’s surveillance activities from meaningful judicial review,” the
Court contended meaningful review was still possible.106 An electronic
communications service provider directed by the government to help with
surveillance could still challenge the directive’s legality in court.107
Clapper thus illustrates the Supreme Court’s approval of the corporate
avatar dynamic: the positioning of the tech company in place of the individual
to initiate judicial review and act as a check on government. During oral
argument, however, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg voiced skepticism that an
electronic communications provider would challenge surveillance requests.108
Her skepticism was not unwarranted. At the time, Directives was the only

101. Id. at 1009.
102. Id. at 1012, 1016.
103. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154–55 (2013). Section 702 of FISA
authorizes “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
to acquire foreign intelligence information,” based on “a determination by the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence” that without the order “intelligence important to the
national security of the United States” will otherwise “be lost.” See FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a),
(c)(2) (2012)).
104. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145–46.
105. Id. at 1146–53.
106. Id. at 1154 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 1155 (citing In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d at 1006–16); id. at 1154 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4), (6)). The
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ lack of judicial review as a basis for their standing argument on other
grounds, including that challenges to surveillance might be raised in court if the government
introduces information gleaned from the surveillance. Id. at 1154; see also United States v.
Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *1, *27 (D. Or. June 24, 2014)
(quoting the government’s Supplemental FISA Notification) (holding section 702 to be
“reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).
108. Oral Argument at 4–6, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11-1025), 2012 WL 5305254, at *4–6.
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instance in which a provider had opposed a FISA surveillance directive.109
And, as Justice Ginsburg noted, that challenge was unsuccessful.110
More recently, a court invoked the corporate avatar dynamic as a sword,
rather than as a shield. Addressing the legality of the government’s bulk
phone metadata collection program, Judge Claire Eagan held that the Fourth
Amendment did not cover the production of telephony metadata under FISA
section 215, a matter she considered resolved by Smith.111
Though the individual telephone user did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy because she communicated the information to a third
party, Judge Eagan invoked the service provider’s statutorily provided right to
challenge the government request to support the program’s
constitutionality.112 Judge Eagan observed that no providers that received an
order to produce the metadata challenged the program’s legality, thus
supporting its legitimacy.113
The simultaneous recognition of a corporation’s right to challenge
requests for information on its customers’ behalf and inference that failing to
exercise that challenge reflects the requests’ legality demonstrate the dangers
109. Letter from the Honorable Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 7–8
(July 29, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Judge Walton], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/courts/fisc/honorable-patrick-leahy.pdf. As early as January 2009, however, it appears
that Sprint raised questions about a FISA order, leading to an amended order regarding its legal
conclusions. See Charlie Savage, Phone Company Pushed Back Against N.S.A.’s Data Collection, Court
Papers Show, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/us/politics/
phone-company-pushed-back-against-nsas-data-collection-court-papers-show.html.
110. Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 5–6.
111. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod.
of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2–3 (FISA Ct. Aug.
29, 2013).
112. Id. at *2 n.13 (“If a service provider believed that a business records order infringed on
its own Fourth Amendment rights, it could raise such a challenge pursuant to 50 U.S.C[.]
§ 1861(f).”). Though the opinion only references the provider’s Fourth Amendment rights, it
should be inferred from Directives that any cause of action asserted by the provider would include
constitutional infringements suffered by its customers. The causes of action set forth in the
different statutes are similar. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (“A person receiving a
production order may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition . . . .”), with Protect
America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 552, 554 (“A [service provider] receiving
a directive . . . may challenge the legality of that directive . . . .”). Another FISC judge later
confirmed this reading, holding that a service provider could assert the Fourth Amendment
rights of its customers. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01, slip op. at 6–9 (FISA Ct. Mar. 20, 2014).
However, District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled that the third-party doctrine applied and
therefore customers were not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection of their non-content
dialing data. Id. at 30–31.
113. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from [Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *5; see also Letter from Judge Walton, supra note
109, at 7 (describing Directives as the only “instance in which the [FISC] heard arguments from a
nongovernmental party that sought to substantively contest a directive from the government”).
But see Savage, supra note 109.
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of the corporate avatar dynamic. As discussed in Part IV, there are many
reasons to question whether the private company can approximate an
individual’s relationship to the government. But it is even more problematic
to presume that the lack of corporate challenge means that government
surveillance is reasonable.
C. STATUTORY ENACTMENT OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC
Due in part to the third-party doctrine and the resulting lack of Fourth
Amendment protection for individual users, Congress has sought to
strengthen privacy safeguards without actually requiring a warrant. But these
purported protections reflect a statutory embrace of the corporate avatar
dynamic. Rather than affording individuals mechanisms to challenge
government requests for their information, Congress has empowered the tech
company, and sometimes simultaneously precluded individuals from seeking
relief.
Two general features of these statutes are: (1) lack of notice to the
individual that the government has requested the person’s data; and
(2) immunity for the tech company’s assistance. As is discussed in Part V,
without notice, the individual most often with the greatest reason to challenge
the surveillance is not even in a position to know whether to challenge. And
as is addressed in Part IV, immunity decreases the likelihood that a tech
company will oppose government surveillance. The SCA (at issue in Warshak)
authorizes service providers to turn over the content and non-content
information relating to wire or electronic communications in response to
government requests.114 The SCA authorizes the provider’s disclosure of
communication contents held more than 180 days without a warrant and
delay of notice for long periods of time.115
The SCA’s provisions provide even less protection for individuals’ “noncontent” data. First, under the SCA, only the service provider has a statutory
right to challenge a court order requiring production of non-content data.116
At least one district court has held that the absence of any provision for a
user’s challenge evinces congressional intent to restrict such challenges to
service providers.117 Second, the SCA affords immunity to service providers

114. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(d) (2012); see also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–24
(2004) (providing a general history and synopsis of the SCA).
115. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii), 2703(d), 2705(a)(1)(A)–(B), 2705(a)(4)
(allowing for a 90-day delay of notification and for an extension of delays based on a certification
of need by a government official); see also Kerr, supra note 114, at 1233–34.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
117. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830
F. Supp. 2d 114, 128–29 (E.D. Va. 2011). The court inferred the preclusion of a customer challenge
in light of the explicit provision in section 2704(b) for customer challenges to orders requiring
service providers to create backup copies of electronic communications. See id. at 129; see also In re
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that comply with government requests made pursuant to the statute.118
Finally, the government is not required to provide notice to users.119
Moreover, the SCA authorizes administrative subpoenas or National
Security Letters (“NSLs”) requiring service providers to turn over the “name,
address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records of a
person or entity” based solely on various Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) officials’ certification that the information is “relevant to an
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.”120 No judicial approval is required. The
FBI can also require the service provider to not disclose the request to anyone
on the basis of national security and other concerns.121 Congress has, however,
permitted service providers the right to “petition for an order modifying or
setting aside the request.”122
The “Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices” Statute123 provides that
the government may obtain court orders authorizing the installation of pen
registers and traps on phone communications based upon a showing that
“information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation being conducted by that agency.”124 Lack of notice and
disincentives for the tech company to challenge a pen register or a trace also
distinguish the statute. The statute also prohibits disclosure of surveillance,
authorizes compensation for providers’ expenses incurred in cooperating,
prohibits any causes of action against third parties providing assistance, and
establishes a good faith reliance defense.125
FISA establishes a framework for foreign intelligence surveillance and
collection that is distinct from the domestic criminal justice sphere.126 Under
FISA, a separate court (the FISC) may grant surveillance requests based on a
lesser showing than the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.127 FISA
Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *5 (comparing section 215 orders to § 2703(d) orders).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e); see also id. § 2707(e) (providing a good faith reliance defense to
civil and criminal actions).
119. Id. § 2703(c)(3).
120. Id. § 2709(b)(1); see also id. § 2703(c)(2). In addition to the SCA, four other statutes
authorize NSLs. See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5) (2012) (covering records of financial institutions);
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (2012) (covering credit reports); 50 U.S.C. § 436 (2012) (covering
records relating to the finances and travel of government employees in connection with classified
information leak investigations).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1).
122. Id. § 3511(a).
123. Id. §§ 3121–3127.
124. Id. § 3122(b)(2). Orders for the installation of pen registers and trap devices are limited
to 60 days but may be extended for additional 60-day periods. Id. § 3123(c).
125. Id. §§ 3123(d), 3124(c)–(e).
126. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c.
127. Id. §§ 1802–1805; see also In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)
(upholding FISA against a Fourth Amendment challenge).
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requires the government to show probable cause only that the electronic
surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.128 The
statute further authorizes the Attorney General to direct common
communications carriers to “furnish all information, facilities, or technical
assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a
manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference
with the services that such carrier is providing its customers.”129 The carrier is
also compensated for its assistance.130
But section 702 of FISA (at issue in Amnesty International) removes the
general FISA “foreign power” or “agent of foreign power” requirement.
Section 702 authorizes the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence to jointly authorize “the targeting of persons reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
information,” subject to FISC approval.131 The section provides that the entity
receiving a production order may file a petition to challenge such
production.132 But the government may direct the electronic communications
provider to assist in the surveillance in a secretive and nonintrusive manner.133
And the statute authorizes compensation for the provider’s assistance134 and
immunizes the provider for its compliance.135
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act—the government’s basis for its
bulk telephony metadata collection—provides that a person receiving an
order of production may file a petition to challenge such production.136
However, lower courts addressing section 215 challenges have held that only
the recipient (i.e., not the user or customer target of the order) can challenge
the order, with the exception of constitutional claims.137 Strict limitations
prohibit the recipient from disclosing the order to anyone.138 The statute also
immunizes anyone who complies with the order.139 Thus, a constitutional
challenge by the individual user or customer is only possible through
unauthorized leaks.140

128. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A)–(B).
129. Id. § 1802(a)(4)(A).
130. Id. § 1802(a)(4)(B).
131. Id. § 1881a(a).
132. Id. § 1881a(h)(4)(A); see also Letter from Judge Walton, supra note 109, at 8. Rule 19(a)
of the FISC Rules of Procedure also may facilitate judicial review by authorizing government
motions for contempt or sanctions based on a party’s noncompliance with a court order. Id.
133. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A).
134. Id. § 1881a(h)(2).
135. Id. § 1881a(h)(3).
136. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i); Letter from Judge Walton, supra note 109, at 8.
137. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 740–42 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22–25 (D.D.C. 2013).
138. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1).
139. Id. § 1861(e).
140. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
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The upshot of these statutes is that the third-party corporation is granted
a means to challenge government requests for information relating to their
users. However, under these statutes, the individual is not notified of the
information collection or the surveillance and the service provider is
statutorily incentivized to assist the government.
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC
The corporate avatar dynamic has been unsuccessful in at least two ways.
First, the vast numbers of government requests for user data and the
corresponding high compliance rate by companies indicate that corporations
do not usually contest the requests. This compliance affects hundreds of
thousands of individuals. Second, the records and judicial opinions from the
few times when tech companies did challenge the government’s requests
demonstrate that tech companies are not likely to make effective arguments
on behalf of users. In short, they are not good avatars.
A. CORPORATE AVATAR CHALLENGES
Usually when the U.S. government requests user data from Internet
companies, the companies provide data. Tech companies’ own reports
support Justice Ginsburg’s incredulity that companies will normally oppose
government requests for user information.141 Though we cannot know the
exact number of instances that companies actively oppose government
requests,142 the reports belie the suggestion that companies are effective
surrogates for their users.143
Examining Google’s response to the government’s requests illustrates the
fallacy of the corporate avatar dynamic.144 As with a number of Internet

141.
142.

See supra text accompanying notes 108–10.
See NATE CARDOZO ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? WHICH
COMPANIES HELP PROTECT YOUR DATA FROM THE GOVERNMENT? THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION’S THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS’ PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY
PRACTICES REGARDING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO USER DATA 13 (2013), available at https://
www.eff.org/sites/default/files/who-has-your-back-2013-report-20130513.pdf (noting that secrecy
requirements and informal challenges help explain the limited record of companies challenging
the government); Miller, supra note 90 (reporting that tech companies may initially push back
against national security requests for customer information and seek modification of requests even
if they ultimately provide information, rather than pursue litigation).
143. It may be fairly asked what percentage of requests a tech company must challenge in
order to consider it a reliable surrogate or avatar. While a specific number may prove elusive, it
is reasonable to expect that a purported guardian of a user’s privacy might object to requests for
the person’s data more often than not. That proposition suggests that a reliable corporate avatar
should challenge requests for users’ data more than 50% of the time.
144. Google is the most useful and important Internet company example, due to its
dominance of the Internet. By one measure, Google accounts for nearly 25% of all Internet
traffic. Craig Labovitz, Google Sets New Internet Record, DEEPFIELD (July 22, 2013), http://www.
deepfield.net/2013/07/google-sets-new-Internet-record; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 35,
at 14 (“[N]o single state, firm, or institution in the world has as much power over Web-based
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companies, Google produces a Transparency Report, which documents
government requests for user data and its compliance.145
In the first half of 2014, Google received 12,539 user data requests,
specifying 21,576 users, from U.S. law enforcement agencies. Google
produced data in response to 84% of the requests.146 In all of 2013, U.S. law
enforcement made 21,492 user data requests to Google, specifying 39,937
users. Google provided data 83% of the time.147
In national security and intelligence-related matters, it is more difficult
to parse the government’s requests for user information and Google’s
compliance rate. Since 2003, the government has made hundreds of
thousands of NSL requests.148 In 2014, the Department of Justice reported
that the FBI had made 14,219 NSL requests (excluding those made solely for
subscriber information) relating “to 5334 United States persons.”149 Google
is only permitted to report a range of the NSLs it received, stating that for the
first half of 2014, it received between 0 and 999 NSLs specifying between 0
and 999 users or accounts.150 In the second half of 2013, the government
issued between 0 and 999 NSLs to Google concerning 1000 and 1999 users
or accounts.151
Under the FISA regime, companies comply nearly 100% of the time with
government directives and orders. In fact, only one time—when Yahoo!

activity as Google does.”). Google suggests that the total number of users specified could be “overinclusive” because different data requests may include the same user or account. Transparency
Report: FAQ, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/faq/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2015).
145. See CARDOZO ET AL., supra note 142, at 11.
146. Transparency Report: Countries (January to June 2014), GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?p=2014-06 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (noting
the data also include requests for information at YouTube). The compliance rate reflects both
complete and partial accommodation of government requests. Id. According to Google, “[w]e
review each request to make sure that it complies with both the spirit and the letter of the law,
and we may refuse to produce information or try to narrow the request in some cases.” Id.
147. Transparency Report: Countries (January to June 2013), GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?p=2013-06 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (including
YouTube data); Transparency Report: Countries (July to December 2013), GOOGLE, http://www.google.com
/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?p=2013-12 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (including
YouTube data).
148. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, FBI Found to Misuse Security Letters, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2008), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/13/AR2008031302277.html (citing
Justice Department Inspector General Glen Fine’s finding that the FBI issued nearly 200,000 national
security letters between 2003 and 2006).
149. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Senator Harry
Reid, Senate Majority Leader 2 (Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Peter J. Kadzik],
available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2013rept.pdf.
150. Transparency Report: Overview (United States), GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/trans
parencyreport/userdatarequests/US/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
151. Id.
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refused to comply with a directive—has a recipient failed to accede to a FISA
production order.152
FISA order recipients’ near-total compliance raises concerns, given the
thousands of secretive requests that have been made. From 1979 through
2013, the government made 35,333 applications to the FISC to conduct
electronic surveillance and physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes.153 Over these 34 years, the FISC disapproved just 12 requests for
collection authority.154 In 2013, the FISC approved all 1588 applications for
authority to conduct electronic surveillance.155 Similarly, the FISC did not
deny any of the 178 applications for business records and tangible things
under section 215 of FISA.156
As with NSLs, Google may only report the range of FISA requests it has
received. Dating back to 2009, Google reports it has received 0 to 999
requests for non-content data under FISA for 0 to 999 users or accounts every
six-month period.157 The government has, however, sought content data
concerning far more users or accounts.158 For example, Google reports that
in the second half of 2013, the government made 0 to 999 requests for
content data under FISA regarding 15,000 to 15,999 users or accounts.159 In
the preceding six-month period, the government sought content data for
9000 to 9999 users or accounts.160
Other Internet companies’ reports also reveal tens of thousands of
government requests for data and—where the companies have disclosed—
high rates of cooperation. According to Facebook’s own self-reporting, during
152. Letter from Judge Walton, supra note 109, at 7; see also supra Part III.B (discussing
Directives). Judge Walton also noted that the FISCR accepted amici curiae briefs from the
American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in In
re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). See Letter from Judge Walton, supra note 109,
at 8 n.10.
153. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979–2014, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO.
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
154. Id.
155. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, supra note 149, at 1. The government notes in its report
that the FISC modified 36 proposed orders. Id. at 1–2 & n.1. FISA defenders argue that
applications and requested orders undergo significant changes through the FISC process. Letter
from the Honorable Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, to Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (Oct.
11, 2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/rankingmember-grassley-letter-131011.pdf.
156. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, supra note 149, at 2. The FISC did modify 141 of the
proposed section 215 orders. Id.
157. Transparency Report: Overview (United States), supra note 150. Google defines “non-content
information” as “the same kind of information that can be requested under a criminal subpoena
or criminal order under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.” Id.
158. Id. Google defines “private content” as “the same kind of information that can be
requested under a criminal search warrant or wiretap order.” Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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the second half of 2013 it received 12,598 U.S. law enforcement requests for
user data, affecting 18,715 accounts.161 Facebook complied with 81.02% of
these requests.162
Phone companies appear to be even worse corporate avatars. For
example, AT&T received 115,925 U.S. criminal and civil litigation demands
in the first half of 2014.163 The company rejected or challenged 2110, or
1.8%, of these demands.164 In the same time period, AT&T also received 1000
to 1999 NSLs concerning 2000 to 2999 customer accounts; 0 to 999 content
requests under FISA pertaining to 33,000 to 33,999 accounts; and 0 to 999
requests for non-content data about 0 to 999 accounts.165 Similarly, Verizon
reports that in the first half of 2014 it received 148,903 U.S. law enforcement
demands for customer data.166 Of these requests, the government sought
72,342 subpoenas, 14,977 warrants, and 37,327 orders for user data.167

161. Government Requests Report: United States (July 2013–December 2013), FACEBOOK, https://
govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20States/2013-H2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
162. Id. In the second half of 2013, Facebook also received 0 to 999 FISA content requests
concerning 5000 to 5999 users or accounts; 0 to 999 FISA non-content requests for 0 to 999
users or accounts; and 0 to 999 NSLs about 0 to 999 users or accounts. Id. Of course, rates of
compliance and the substance of the information provided vary with Internet companies.
Microsoft reports that in the first half of 2014, it received 6919 user data requests and 15,730
users specified from U.S. law enforcement agencies. Corporate Citizenship: Law Enforcement Requests
Report, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/
transparency (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (click “2014 (JAN–JUN),” then click the “United States”
tile below). Microsoft data include all its services, including Skype. Id. (click “Which Microsoft
Services are included in this report?”). Of these requests, Microsoft rejected 13.4%; lacked data
for 14%; provided transactional or subscriber data for 62.5%; and disclosed content data for
10.1%. Id. Microsoft also reports that in the second half of 2013, it received 0 to 999 orders under
FISA seeking content, impacting 18,000 to 18,999 accounts; 0 to 999 orders under FISA seeking
non-content data, affecting 0 to 999 accounts; and 0 to 999 NSLs about 0 to 999 accounts.
Corporate Citizenship: U.S. National Security Orders Report, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.
com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/fisa/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Twitter, by
comparison, reports that in the first half of 2014, it received 1257 data requests pertaining to
1918 specific accounts, to which the company provided some information 72% of the time.
Transparency Report: United States, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/country/us (last
visited Mar. 7, 2015). Twitter distinguished itself in its reporting of notice to the user. Twitter
states that in the first six months of 2014, it gave notice to users about 6% of U.S. law
enforcement’s information requests. Id. Twitter also reports that 11% of requests were under
seal, precluding notice. Id. No notice was provided 83% of the time, despite the lack of a seal. Id.
163. AT&T INC., AT&T TRANSPARENCY REPORT 3 (2014), available at http://about.att.com/
content/dam/csr/PDFs/ATT_Transparency%20Report_July%202014.pdf. From AT&T’s own
data, it appears that civil litigation demands comprise 7968 subpoenas. Id.
164. Id. at 4. In addition to the rejections and challenges, AT&T reports that it provided
either only partial or no information in response to 28,987 demands. Id.
165. Id. at 3.
166. VERIZON, VERIZON’S TRANSPARENCY REPORT FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 2014: UNITED
STATES REPORT 1 (2014), available at http://transparency.verizon.com/themes/site_themes/
transparency/archive/Verizon-Transparency-Report-2014-first-half.pdf.
167. Id.
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Verizon refused to comply with approximately 3% of the subpoenas and
approximately 4.5% of the orders and warrants.168
B. THE PROBLEM OF NONDISCLOSURE
The tech companies’ transparency reports achieve their eponymous
objective at only the most general level.169 Frequently, the companies do not
tell their users about the government surveillance specific to them. Google
explains in its Transparency Report that it notifies users about legal demands,
unless prohibited by law or court order.170 Google asserts that “[i]n certain
cases” it will “push back regardless of whether the user decides to challenge
[a request] legally.”171 But when Google will fight limits on disclosure is not
clear from its report.172 In addition, as Google acknowledges, FISA request

168. Id.
169. Tech companies’ transparency reports reveal more data than had been previously
permitted by the United States government. Earlier reports had not been permitted to include
even ranges of FISA and NSL requests. Litigation efforts by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo!,
and Linkedin precipitated a settlement with the government allowing publication of more data.
See Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.’s First Amendment Right to Publish
Aggregate Information About FISA Orders at 4, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google
Inc.’s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, No. Misc.
13-03 (FISA Ct. June 18, 2013); Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Colin
Stretch, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Facebook, et al. 1–2 (Jan. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/366201412716018407143.pdf (stating that the
“letter memorializes additional ways in which the government will permit [tech companies] to
report data concerning requests for customer information,” specifically including the
publication, albeit in aggregate form, of FISA orders and NSLs). Twitter, however, has sued the
United States government over the continuing limitations on data concerning NSLs and FISArelated orders. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, Twitter,
Inc. v. Holder, No. 14-cv-4480 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014). Twitter claims the limitations amount to
a violation of the First Amendment and seeks to report smaller ranges of data requests, whether
zero requests were made, and additional descriptive details. Id. at 11–12.
170. Transparency Report: Legal Process, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
userdatarequests/legalprocess/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
171. Id.
172. A prior iteration of Google’s explanation to users concerning notice indicated it would
only provide notice “when appropriate” and that it would “sometimes fight” government data
requests. See CARDOZO ET AL., supra note 142, at 10–11 (criticizing Google for “ambiguity” of policy
and noting that some Internet companies’ policies, including those of Twitter and LinkedIn, are
less equivocal in their commitment to notifying users of government data requests); Shara Tibken,
Google: Here’s How We Handle Government Requests About You, CNET (Jan. 28, 2013, 8:19 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-heres-how-we-handle-government-requests-about-you (“We
sometimes fight to give users notice of a data request by seeking to lift gag orders or unseal search
warrants.” (quoting Google’s earlier transparency policy) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even Twitter, an Internet company long praised for its users’ privacy protection, reports that it
only gives users notice of government requests for data 6% of the time, despite 89% of these
requests having not been made “under seal.” Transparency Report: United States, supra note 162; see
also supra note 162.
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recipients cannot disclose even the fact of the demand, and the government
can prohibit the disclosure of NSLs quite easily.173
Orin Kerr observes that third-party businesses may assert their users’ First
Amendment rights in challenging NSLs.174 ISPs certainly may assert their
customer’s rights when the interests of users and providers coincide. But very
rarely does a communications service provider actually challenge the
nondisclosure requirement.
Notwithstanding the free speech interest of third-party businesses, “[t]he
typical NSL recipient . . . has little if any incentive to initiate a court challenge
in order to speak publicly about such receipt.”175 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that although there were 40,000 NSL
requests issued in 2005, “perhaps no more than three” service providers
challenged the nondisclosure requirement.176
Based in part on how infrequently providers actually challenge requests,
the Second Circuit fashioned an alternative judicial review mechanism for the
nondisclosure requirement. Instead of mandating that the government
initiate judicial review of all nondisclosure orders, the court construed the
statute to require the government to just inform the provider that it can
contest the nondisclosure, and if there is opposition, the government would
be required to seek judicial review.177 In response to the decision, the Justice

173. Transparency Report: FAQ, supra note 144.
174. Kerr, supra note 4, at 599–600 (discussing Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded by John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861
(2d Cir. 2008)).
175. John Doe, Inc., 549 F.3d at 880. The process is very difficult and highly secretive for an
NSL recipient. For a good description of the NSL process from a recipient’s perspective, see
Maria Bustillos, What It’s Like to Get a National-Security Letter, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2013), http://
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-its-like-to-get-a-national-security-letter.
176. John Doe, Inc., 549 F.3d at 879. There are few other cases documenting service providers’
challenges to the government’s gag orders on NSLs. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp.
2d 1064, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2013)(“[D]espite evidence demonstrating that tens of thousands of
NSLs are issued each year—and by the government’s own estimate, 97% of them may come with
a nondisclosure order—only a handful of challenges to the NSL provisions have been brought.”);
id. at 1074 n.12 (referring to a challenge of a nondisclosure order in 2012 in the Eastern District
of Virginia but noting “the NSL recipient did not appear in Court or otherwise participate”); Doe
v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 82 (D. Conn. 2005); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated in part by Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2006); see also In re
Nat’l Sec. Letters, No. C-13-80063 SI, slip op. at 2–4 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013); Declan McCullagh,
Justice Department Tries to Force Google to Hand Over User Data, CNET (May 31, 2013, 9:21 AM),
www.cnet.com/news/justice-department-tries-to-force-google-to-hand-over-user-data/ (describing
Google’s and the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s challenges against NSLs on behalf of service
providers).
177. John Doe, Inc., 549 F.3d at 883–84.
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Department requires that all NSLs inform recipients that they may challenge
the gag order “through the government initiated judicial review.”178
Although this solution empowers the service provider, it does not support
separation-of-powers principles.179 Judicial review occurs only if the provider
objects to the NSL. Thus, the service provider is the primary check on
Executive branch overreaching, and its interests in disclosure are not clear
and may not coincide with users.
C. CORPORATE AVATAR ARGUMENTS
Gonzales v. Google, Inc. is the paradigmatic case of an ISP’s successfully
fighting a government request for user data.180 It is frequently cited to praise
Google’s concern for user interests and to support a tech company’s ability to
fight for user rights and limit government searches.181 But in addition to being
something of an outlier, Google’s arguments in the case call into question the
adequacy of the corporate avatar’s representation of an individual’s interests.
To obtain information about filtering and blocking software that was
related to litigation over the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection
Act, the government subpoenaed several search engines’ search query records
and a listing of URLs available to their users.182 Google, unlike the other
companies, contested the subpoenas, which initially sought all URLs available
for search requests and all users’ queries entered on Google for a two-month
period.183 Google argued that the information was not relevant and that
producing the data was an undue burden.184
But beyond asserting that “[t]he privacy of Google users matters,” Google
only addressed the disclosure’s effect on its business and consumer
confidence.185 Google argued that if compelled to produce the data, it would

178. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 2 (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.wired.
com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/letter_to_patrick_leahy_2010.12.09.pdf.
179. See In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (holding that “the nondisclosure
provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) violates the First Amendment and” that the limited scope of
judicial review under “18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) violate[s] the First Amendment and
separation of powers principles”).
180. Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
181. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 4, at 599; Transparency Report: Legal Process, supra note 170 (“For
example, in 2006 Google was the only major search company that refused a U.S. government
request to hand over two months’ [sic] of user search queries. We objected to the subpoena, and
eventually a court denied the government’s request.”).
182. Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 678–79.
183. Id. at 679. Google first negotiated the government requests down to 50,000 URLs and
5000 search entries, but still objected to these reduced demands. Id.
184. Id. at 682–83.
185. Google’s Opposition to the Government’s Motion to Compel at 2, 19, Gonzales, 234
F.R.D. 674 (No. 5:06-mc-80006-JW), 2006 WL 543697.
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“suffer a loss of trust among users,” and that users would “be less likely to use
the service.”186
The district court appreciated that Google’s privacy arguments did not
extend to Google users. On its own, the court considered Google users’
privacy interests as distinct “from Google’s business goodwill argument.”187
The court suggested users’ search queries could reveal particular sensitive
information, a concern that, the court noted, was not raised by Google or the
government.188
Ultimately, the court did not rule on the potential customer privacy
rights violations because it determined the search query information was
duplicative and could harm Google users’ trust.189 The court therefore
granted the government’s motion to compel production, but only as to the
URLs.
If Google, Inc. is the lodestar case for the corporate avatar dynamic, then
there is ample reason to worry. First, despite Google’s opposition, Yahoo!,
AOL, and Microsoft acceded to the government requests for data.190 Thus,
the case doesn’t represent what most tech companies do in response to
government demands for user data. Internet companies’ own records on
compliance with government data requests demonstrate how truly
exceptional a case like Google, Inc. is.191 As a result, the case offers minimal
support for the proposition that third parties will protect their customers’
privacy interests or sufficiently challenge government excess.
Second, how a party makes its arguments and what it argues matters.
Google’s failure to effectively assert its customers’ privacy rights raises
questions about service providers’ interest, commitment, and ability to
effectively challenge government searches. Though Google’s arguments
invoked customer privacy, the arguments were framed in terms of perceptions
about Google and loss of goodwill—it was focused on the injury to Google,
rather than to the users—a perhaps less sympathetic framing than the users’
own violation or loss of privacy.192
That Google did not muster a more aggressive privacy argument may also
be understandable given the search engine’s business.193 Arguing an
aggressive or expansive form of customer privacy would also have been against
Google’s own business interests. The more expansive a conception of privacy

186. Id. at 18; see also Gonzales, 234 F.R.D at 684–85.
187. Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 687.
188. Id. For example, the court noted, a user might enter a search query for “[user name]
third trimester abortion san jose.” Id.
189. Id. at 686, 688.
190. Id. at 679.
191. See supra Part IV.A.
192. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 35, at 87 (contending that Google opposed the
government’s demands “not to protect its users’ privacy but to protect its trade secrets”).
193. See infra Part V.A.4 (discussing Internet companies’ attitudes toward user privacy).
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from disclosure to other parties of information supplied to Google, the more
limited Google might be in providing customer information to not only the
government, but to other commercial entities, such as advertisers, which is
the primary source of revenue for Google.194
While the court made findings about users’ privacy sua sponte, the lack
of a true customer advocate is problematic. An advocate is likely to marshal
more aggressive arguments than may a neutral decisionmaker. Google and
other third-party businesses cannot be expected to assert the rights of their
customers. Indeed, in many cases, there is even a conflict of interest, as it
would seem there was here. Although Google did challenge the government
and limited the scope and substance of information it had to produce, that
Google did not actually assert the rights of its customers is significant. In other
cases, the lack of that advocacy may impact the judge in upholding or denying
government requests for customer information. At the very least, Google’s
limited assertion of customer rights, together with other Internet companies’
acquiescence, raises doubts about whether government overreach may be
deterred by corporations’ lawyers.195
Other service providers have of course challenged government requests
for user data as well. But the mixed results and efforts evidence the limits of
vesting privacy protection in corporations.196 Though Yahoo! succeeded in
securing the right to bring a “Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of its
customers,” the FISCR upheld the government’s warrantless surveillance
directives.197 The court held in Directives “that a foreign intelligence exception
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement exists when surveillance is
conducted to obtain foreign intelligence for national security purposes and is
directed against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States.”198 The court characterized
the government interest in national security to be “of the highest order of
magnitude,” and dismissed Yahoo!’s concerns as a “parade of horribles,”
without “evidence of any actual harm, any egregious risk of error, or any broad
potential for abuse in the circumstances of the instant case.”199 The
government’s national security interest may have been insurmountable but,
194. See Ryan Singel, How Does Google Make the Big Bucks? An Infographic Answer, WIRED (July
19, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.wired.com/2011/07/google-revenue-sources.
195. Cf. Kerr, supra note 4, at 600.
196. Twitter has distinguished itself as perhaps the most aggressive advocate for its users’
privacy, but these efforts have met limited success. See, e.g., Russ Buettner, A Brooklyn Protester Pleads
Guilty After His Twitter Posts Sink His Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/13/nyregion/malcolm-harris-pleads-guilty-over-2011-march.html (describing Twitter’s
efforts to quash a subpoena requiring the production of a user’s old and deleted tweets and the
company’s ultimate compliance).
197. In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
198. Id. at 1012.
199. Id. at 1012–13.
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as a corporate entity, it was doubtless more difficult for Yahoo!, than for a
person, to convince a court of actual harm and rise above theoretical
wrongs.200
Service providers have also argued since at least 2004 that warrants were
required for government requests for email contents.201 But service providers’
concerns about uniformity of policy and limiting their own liability may have
motivated these arguments more than protecting their users’ privacy.
In United States v. Weaver, for example, the government subpoenaed a
defendant child pornographer’s MSN/Hotmail email contents.202 Microsoft
refused to produce previously opened emails less than 181 days old.203 But
rather than directly respond to the government’s motion to compel
compliance with the subpoena, Microsoft wrote a one-page letter, asking only
that the government include it with the motion to compel. Microsoft simply
stated that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Theofel v. Farey-Jones required a
warrant, and the opinion applied because Microsoft is headquartered within
the Ninth Circuit and compliance with the subpoena would occur there.204
Microsoft explained that “the Ninth Circuit has deemed opened email to be
in electronic storage for backup preservation” and therefore, required a
warrant per the SCA.205 The district court was unpersuaded by Microsoft’s
arguments, however, and ordered Microsoft to comply with the subpoena.206
200. See id. at 1008. Yahoo!’s efforts deserve plaudits. Yahoo!’s resolute pursuit of its
challenge on behalf of its users was made under threat of civil contempt fines of $250,000 per
day. Vindu Goel & Charlie Savage, Government’s Threat of Daily Fine for Yahoo Shows Aggressive Push
for Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/technology/docu
ments-unsealed-in-yahoos-case-against-us-data-requests.html. It also appears that only Yahoo!,
among seven other companies receiving surveillance requests, challenged the government. See
id. Many of the documents related to the litigation have been declassified thanks to Yahoo!’s
efforts and are available for viewing. See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Statement by the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Department of Justice on the Declassification of
Documents Related to the Protect America Act Litigation, IC ON THE RECORD (Sept. 11, 2014), http://
icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/97251906083/statement-by-the-office-of-the-director-of.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009); Yahoo! Inc.’s
Response to the United States’ Motion to Compel Compliance with This Court’s 2703(d) Order
at 1, In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), No.
Misc. 09-Y-080-CBS (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2010).
202. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 769.
203. Id. at 770.
204. Id. at 770–72 (analyzing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003)); Letter
from Richard Sauer, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Microsoft, to Elly N. Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney
(June 18, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Richard Sauer], available at http://ia601406.us.archive.
org/34/items/gov.uscourts.ilcd.46490/gov.uscourts.ilcd.46490.12.1.pdf (marked as “Exhibit
2”); see also Dan Sachs, Another Federal Court Rules That Opened Emails Are Not in “Electronic Storage”
Under the Stored Communications Act, ZWILLGEN BLOG (June 20, 2013), http://blog.zwillgen.com/
2013/06/20/another-federal-court-rules-that-opened-emails-are-not-in-electronic-storage-under
-the-stored-communications-act (“Because many national service providers are based in the Ninth
Circuit, Theofel has effectively been the law of the land for many years.”).
205. Letter from Richard Sauer, supra note 204; see also Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
206. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 773.
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Although arguments pushing for the Ninth Circuit’s expansive definition of
“electronic storage” in another circuit could redound to users’ privacy
protection, the short paragraphs in the letter suggest Microsoft may have been
primarily concerned with not running afoul of the SCA’s limits on disclosure
and the company’s exposure to liability.207 Such motivations are unlikely to
effectively limit government overreach, particularly where the law immunizes
companies from liability for complying with government requests for
customer data.
V. THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC FALLACY
This Part first explores why the technology industry is unlikely to
challenge government requests for user information. But even if tech
companies were to challenge government surveillance more frequently and
vigorously, their role as the public’s avatars presents a normative problem.
This Part then examines how the substitution of corporate entities for people
controverts the government oversight purposes of the Fourth Amendment
and the Framers’ skepticism about corporate power.
A. THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC’S FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
1. Tech Companies’ Relationships with the Government
The government and tech companies enjoy a close, interdependent
relationship that is highly beneficial to both sectors.208 This relationship,
which has blossomed since the end of the Cold War, has grown into the
“intelligence-industrial complex.”209 In the most practical terms, the
government could not conduct any of its electronic surveillance without the
private companies providing the instruments and services through which we
communicate.210 The NSA’s highest level technology is designed by private

207. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2707 (2012) (setting forth limits on voluntary disclosure and
civil action, relief, and damages for improper disclosure); see also Yahoo! Inc.’s Response to the
United States’ Motion to Compel Compliance with This Court’s 2703(d) Order, supra note 201,
at 2 n.1 (“The ruling that the government seeks in this matter would force Yahoo! to either endure
a contempt penalty in this court or become vulnerable to civil liability within the Ninth Circuit.”).
208. See, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 35, at 48–49 (noting Google’s “close relationship”
with the Obama administration); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1940–41 (2013) (describing the private sector and government surveillance as mutually
supportive); Julian Assange, Op-Ed., The Banality of ‘Don’t Be Evil,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/the-banality-of-googles-dont-be-evil.html
(decrying “the ever closer union between the State Department and Silicon Valley”).
209. Michael Hirsh, How America’s Top Tech Companies Created the Surveillance State, NAT’L J.
(July 25, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/how-america-s-top-tech-companiescreated-the-surveillance-state-20130725.
210. See JAY ROCKEFELLER, SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 10 (2007);
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 5–6.
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tech companies.211 There is a virtual revolving door between tech companies
and government intelligence and the military.212 In addition, tech companies
store tremendous amounts of our data and have the expertise and capacity to
analyze the data.213
Private companies also court and serve the government as a client for
their electronic communication and big data services. Government agencies
contract with tech companies for computing services.214 These contracts, in
particular for cloud computing services, total hundreds of millions of
dollars.215 Google, for example, supplies government agencies with products
such as Google Apps that facilitate email and data storage.216 At least 42,000
federal government employees and contractors use the company’s cloudbased email.217 Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency has solicited and
received bids from various tech companies, including Amazon, Microsoft, and
IBM to provide cloud computing services to the intelligence agency.218 The
government also pays out hundreds of millions of dollars to the technology
industry for mobile communications devices.219 Thus, tech companies’

211. Hirsh, supra note 209 (noting that government surveillance networks “are virtually
interwoven with [tech companies’] products”).
212. See Rebecca Greenfield, Facebook’s Former Security Chief Now Works for the NSA, WIRE (June 20,
2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.thewire.com/technology/2013/06/facebooks-former-security-chiefnow-works-nsa/66432/; Hirsh, supra note 209; Somini Sengupta, The Pentagon as Silicon Valley’s
Incubator, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/technology/thepentagon-as-start-up-incubator.html (noting that there are few entities besides the NSA, Facebook,
and Google with engineers who have data mining experience).
213. James Risen & Nick Wingfield, Web’s Reach Binds N.S.A. and Silicon Valley Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/technology/silicon-valley-andspy-agency-bound-by-strengthening-web.html.
214. See, e.g., Apple Store for Government, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/r/store/government/
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Government, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/government/enus/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
215. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Hoover, Military Signs Most Comprehensive Microsoft Contract Yet,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 3, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/
enterprise-applications/military-signs-most-comprehensive-micros/240145467.
216. See Google Apps for Government, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/enterprise/apps/
government/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Google Government Transformers, GOOGLE, http://www.
govtransformers.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (describing various Google products and
services used by local governments).
217. See, e.g., Kennith Jackson, NOAA Moves 25,000 to Google Apps, OFFICIAL GOOGLE FOR WORK
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012), http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com/2012/01/noaa-moves-25000-togoogle-apps.html (stating that 25,000 people are employed at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration); Lance Whitney, Google Scores Big Federal Government Contract, CNET
(Dec. 2, 2010, 9:07 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-scores-big-federal-governmentcontract/ (stating that 17,000 people are employed at the U.S. General Services Administration).
218. See IBM, B-407073, 2013 WL 2897034, at *1–3 (Comp. Gen. June 6, 2013); Joseph
Marks, Amazon Sues over CIA Cloud Deal, NEXTGOV (July 29, 2013), http://www.nextgov.com/
cloud-computing/2013/07/amazon-sues-over-cia-cloud-deal/67592/.
219. See, e.g., Dara Kerr, Defense Department Opens Contracts for Apple, Google, CNET (Feb. 26,
2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/defense-department-opens-contracts-for-apple-
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extensive and lucrative business relationships with the government may limit
their ability to act impartially, let alone act in their users’ interests, in
responding to government requests and court orders for user information.220
In addition, the government regulates private tech companies’ services,
including, ironically, their compliance with consumer privacy protections.221
Again, tech companies have a clear interest in appeasing the government in
its law enforcement and security interests when they are subject to the
government’s regulatory arms, such as the Federal Communications
Commission and Federal Trade Commission.222
2. Government Control over Private Communications Systems
Sharing communications and other customer information with the
government is already part of some technologies’ DNA. Moreover, laws and
security agreements may compel communications service providers to enable
their services and products to conduct surveillance at the government’s
request.
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”),223
for example, requires telecommunications carriers and communications
equipment manufacturers to ensure that their products and services permit
the government to intercept wire and electronic communications and access
call-identifying information.224 Broadband Internet access and voice over
Internet protocol (“VoIP”) services are also subject to CALEA.225 Information
services providers, including web-based service providers, are not similarly
obligated to modify their services and products to enable government
surveillance.226 But law enforcement has proposed legislation that would
google/ (reporting that the U.S. Defense Department expects to utilize 8,000,000 mobile
devices).
220. Hirsh, supra note 209 (“[I]t’s the good little Indian that gets rewarded. And these
companies needed the goodwill of the NSA and other agencies.” (quoting an anonymous privatesector official) (internal quotation marks omited)).
221. Tom Risen, Data Plans, Caps Stoke FCC Net Neutrality Concerns, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(July 31, 2014, 1:04 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/31/data-plans-capsstoke-fcc-net-neutrality-concerns. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS
(2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326
privacyreport.pdf.
222. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 221.
223. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012)).
224. See id. §§ 1002, 1005.
225. See Am. Council on Educ. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 451 F.3d 226, 234–35 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (deferring to the FCC decision requiring broadband and VoIP providers to comply with
CALEA).
226. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6) (defining “information services”); id. § 1002(b)(2)(A)
(excluding information service providers from CALEA requirements to modify services and
product to aid law enforcement).
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apply CALEA-like requirements to web-based companies. These requirements
range from compelling companies to modify their infrastructure to enable
“wiretaps” of emails to a series of escalating fines for noncompliance with
government requests.227
The NSA has also enjoyed access to tech companies’ encryption
technologies, approving their export only when the NSA is permitted to both
review the technologies and have a “back door” to the data it wanted.228 Tech
companies also may opt to change their code and architecture to facilitate
government surveillance, rather than have the government impose its own
devices or changes to code and architecture.229
Lessig has warned that CALEA and similar government efforts “induce
the development of an architecture that makes behavior more regulable.”230
The interdependent relationship of commerce and government, Lessig
argues, allows the government to exploit tech companies’ financial interests,
forcing changes in the Internet’s architecture that are not in individual users’
interests.231 Indeed, once the technological infrastructure enables
government surveillance, there is less reason for companies to fight a data
request. Without a practical impediment and the concomitant costs associated

227. See Declan McCullagh, FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now, CNET (May 4, 2012, 9:24
AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now; Ellen Nakashima,
Proposal Seeks to Fine Tech Companies for Noncompliance with Wiretap Orders, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/proposal-seeks-to-fine-tech-companiesfor-noncompliance-with-wiretap-orders/2013/04/28/29e7d9d8-a83c-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_
story.html; see also BEN ADIDA ET AL., CALEA II: RISKS OF WIRETAP MODIFICATIONS TO ENDPOINTS 2,
4–7 (2013), available at https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CALEAII-techreport.pdf (criticizing
proposed legislation).
228. Hirsh, supra note 209; see also Shane Harris, Google’s Secret NSA Alliance: The Terrifying
Deals Between Silicon Valley and the Security State, SALON (Nov. 16, 2014, 5:58 AM), http://www.
salon.com/2014/11/16/googles_secret_nsa_alliance_the_terrifying_deals_between_silicon_val
ley_and_the_security_state/ (describing NSA partnerships with tech companies that include the
corporate disclosure of weaknesses and back doors to the agency in order to improve their
security against cyber attacks); David E. Sanger & Claire Cain Miller, In Keeping Grip on Data
Pipeline, Obama Does Little to Reassure Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/01/18/technology/in-keeping-grip-on-data-pipeline-obama-does-little-to-reassureindustry.html (noting the government paid RSA, an encryption firm, to include an inferior
algorithm in its products in order to facilitate “back door” access for the NSA); Craig Timberg,
Police Want Back Doors in Smartphones, but You Never Know Who Else Will Open Them, WASH. POST (Oct.
2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/10/02/police-want-backdoors-in-smartphones-but-you-never-know-who-else-will-open-them/ (describing security experts’
general criticism of back doors and the government’s concerns about Apple’s and Google’s
encryption of their devices).
229. See Declan McCullagh, How the U.S. Forces Net Firms to Cooperate on Surveillance, CNET (July
12, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/how-the-u-s-forces-net-firms-to-cooperate-onsurveillance (describing Microsoft’s decision to design a system allowing for cooperation with
government requests in order to avoid the government’s implanting of a surveillance device in its
internal system).
230. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 62.
231. Id. at 77–80.
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with overcoming logistical hurdles to provide the data, technological
companies will have fewer reasons to resist government requests.
3. The Private Tech Company as a Public Actor
The United States depends on digital communications for much of our
critical infrastructure, such as communications, delivery of electricity, or
traffic control.232 Digital communications are a matter of public importance
but are largely controlled by private companies. Recognizing the networked
nature of the country’s cyber infrastructure and its attendant vulnerability,
the Obama administration has sought to encourage the private sector to join
a “Cybersecurity Framework.”233
Increasing public-private partnerships may serve very real security needs
that require collaboration and uniformity. These partnerships seek to stave
off cybersecurity attacks, authorizing information sharing between private
companies and the government and the employment of private subject-matter
experts in the federal government.234
These partnerships, however, reduce the public-private divide, raising
questions about the differences in objectives and responsibilities.235 The
collaboration makes it less likely a large corporation will view its security
obligations as distinct from that of the government and will instead act like an
agent of the government.236 For example, larger tech companies appear less
likely than smaller ones to challenge government requests for user
information and related nondisclosure provisions.237
Collaboration in the form of a “Cybersecurity Framework” bears more
than passing resemblance to the U.S. government’s cooperation with AT&T
in the 20th century to advance American science. As Tim Wu has observed,
public-private partnership “goes a long way to explain how AT&T, as it
matured, became in effect almost a branch of government, charged with topsecret work in the national interest.”238 If indeed many tech companies, acting

232. See Michael Daniel, Improving the Security of the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 13, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/13/
improving-security-nation-s-critical-infrastructure.
233. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 3 C.F.R. 217, 219 (2014).
234. See id. at 218.
235. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 5–6.
236. Corporations do, however, retain interests distinct from the government, including
corporate espionage, data breaches, and consumer confidence.
237. Cf. Miller, supra note 90 (observing that “[s]mall companies are more likely to take the
government to court . . . because they have fewer government relationships and customers, and
fewer disincentives to rock the boat”); Elena Schneider, Technology Companies Are Pressing Congress
to Bolster Privacy Protections, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/
us/technology-firms-press-congress-to-tighten-privacy-law.html (suggesting that after Snowden’s
revelations, smaller companies are more likely to comply with government requests because of their
ignorance of legal requirements and litigation costs).
238. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 105 (2010).
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in the national interest out of whatever motivation, be it security-minded
patriotism or financial motivation, act like a government branch or agency,
they may be less inclined to oppose government requests for user
information.
Tech companies’ roles as global players and commercial behemoths also
explain why these companies may find common cause with the government.
Information companies like AT&T and Verizon now rank among the world’s
100 largest economic entities.239 Amazon, Apple, and Yahoo!’s revenues
similarly exceed that of many countries’ gross domestic product.240 Thus, their
interests—financial, political, or security-related—will often coincide with
that of other global powers, including the U.S. government.241 Though their
concerns may be legitimate, it raises the question of whether tech companies
can effectively voice populist concerns of privacy over those of security and
shared government interests.242
4. Tech Companies’ Attitudes Toward Privacy
In the immediate wake of the Snowden leaks and news about the PRISM
program,243 Aaron Levie, CEO of Box.com, tweeted: “PRISM: Your Gmail,
Google, Facebook, Skype data all in one place. The NSA just beat out like 30
startups to this idea.”244 Levie’s tweet provides at least one explanation for
tech companies’ acquiescence to government requests for user information.
239. See TRACEY KEYS & THOMAS MALNIGHT, CORPORATE CLOUT: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
WORLD’S LARGEST 100 ECONOMIC ENTITIES 9 (2012), available at http://www.globaltrends.com/
images/stories/corporate%20clout%20the%20worlds%20100%20largest%20economic%20en
tities.pdf.
240. Vincent Trivett, 25 US Mega Corporations: Where They Rank If They Were Countries, BUS.
INSIDER (June 27, 2011, 11:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-biggertan-countries-2011-6?op=1 (showing that “Amazon.com is bigger than Kenya . . . Apple is bigger
than Ecuador [and] Yahoo is bigger than Mongolia”).
241. See, e.g., David Barboza, Chinese Dissident, Jailed on Evidence Provided by Yahoo, Is Freed, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/world/asia/wang-xiaoningchinese-dissident-in-yahoo-case-freed.html (describing a Chinese dissident’s criminal conviction
based on evidence Yahoo! provided to the Chinese government).
242. Most of the largest technological companies supported proposed legislation, the “Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act,” notwithstanding the concerns of many privacy and civil
liberties groups. See Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong.
(2013); Gregory Ferenstein, Hey Internet, Where’s the Outrage?, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2013, 2:27
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/hey-internet-wheres-the-outrage/
2013/03/13/caf1f4b2-8c03-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_blog.html.
243. Gellman & Poitras, supra note 2.
244. Aaron Levie, TWITTER (June 6, 2013, 4:24 PM), https://twitter.com/levie/status/34278
3997232959488. A glib, if not hostile, attitude toward privacy has been a common perspective of
Internet entrepreneurs. Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, said as early as 1999 that “[y]ou
have zero privacy . . . . Get over it.” Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get over It,’ WIRED (Jan. 26,
1999), http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. Google CEO Eric Schmidt
said, “If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing
it in the first place.” JEFF JARVIS, PUBLIC PARTS: HOW SHARING IN THE DIGITAL AGE IMPROVES THE
WAY WE WORK AND LIVE 127 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The government’s surveillance is not all that distinct from what many of the
companies do, albeit with a different objective.245 After all, “[t]he primary
business model of the Internet is built on mass surveillance.”246 Thus,
opposition to government surveillance might pose an almost existential crisis
for many tech companies.
This is why tech companies have, at best, conflicted and often paradoxical
positions regarding individual users’ privacy. On the one hand, tech
companies seek to acquire as much information as possible from users. On
the other hand, to gain access to that information in the first place, many
companies assure their users that their information will be private and
secure.247 And yet, they monetize the information by selling it to advertisers.
As a result, tech companies have long preferred self-governance to regulation,
arguing that restricting access to certain kinds of information could stunt
online growth and innovation.248 Though the early creators of the Internet
and tech companies may have harbored anti-establishment, libertarian
impulses, profit motives in an information-driven industry have reconfigured
tech companies’ relationship to users’ privacy.249
5. Immunity
Tech companies also may decide to comply with government requests
because of statutory immunity. FISA grants prospective immunity to
communications providers as long as the Attorney General certifies the

245. Risen & Wingfield, supra note 213 (noting that both the NSA and Silicon Valley “hunt
for ways to collect, analyze and exploit large pools of data about millions of Americans”); see also
Richards, supra note 208, at 1938 (describing private companies’ surveillance activities and
stating that “[s]urveillance is not just for governments either”).
246. Bruce Schneier, The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership, BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2013, 6:00
PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-07-31/the-public-private-surveillance-partner
ship.html. The public appears to recognize the twin-like “Big Brother” aspect to Internet
surveillance, trusting a company like Google slightly less than the government. See Troy Mathew,
What’s Worse Than Your Mom Seeing Your Web History? The NSA, Google, SURVATA (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.survata.com/blog/whats-worse-than-your-mom-seeing-your-web-history-the-nsa-google
(reporting survey results finding that people would be slightly more concerned if Google had access
to all their personal electrical data, rather than the government).
247. David Streitfeld & Quentin Hardy, Data-Driven Tech Industry Is Shaken by Online Privacy Fears,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/technology/data-driven-techindustry-is-shaken-by-online-privacy-fears.html; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tech Companies Tread
Lightly in Statements on U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 10, 2013, 9:06 PM), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/tech-companies-tread-lightly-in-statements-on-u-s-spying (stating
how many companies deny that they give the U.S. government access to their data).
248. Claire Cain Miller, Larry Page Defends Google’s Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct. 17, 2012,
10:05 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/larry-page-defends-googles-privacy-policy;
Claire Cain Miller, Larry Page on Regulation, Maps and Google’s Social Mission, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct.
17, 2012, 9:58 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/larry-page-on-regulation-mapsand-googles-social-mission/; Streitfeld & Hardy, supra note 247.
249. See Miller, supra note 90; Streitfeld & Hardy, supra note 247.
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companies properly acceded to government requests.250 Coupled with the
litigation costs, particularly legal challenges against the government over
issues of law enforcement and security, these prospective statutory defenses
from lawsuits may curb tech companies’ instincts to challenge government
requests.
But the precedent of retroactive immunity may also keep tech companies
from challenging government requests. In the wake of litigation against
telecommunications providers for cooperating with the Bush administration’s
warrantless Terrorist Surveillance Program, Congress passed the FISA
Amendments Act (“FISAAA”).251 Section 802 of FISAAA authorized the
dismissal of dozens of lawsuits against companies for actions taken pursuant
to presidential directives.252
Congress elected to provide retroactive immunity precisely because of
the incentives it would create.253 Congress wanted to encourage private tech
companies to cooperate with future government requests for user data.254 As
Senator Russ Feingold observed in opposing the immunity provisions, “[i]f we
want [telecommunications providers] to obey the law in the future, doesn’t it
send a terrible message, doesn’t it set a terrible precedent, to give them a ‘get
out of jail free’ card for allegedly ignoring the law in the past?”255 Thus, it
seems clear Congress intended, and privacy advocates feared, that immunity
provisions, both retroactive and prospective, would deter tech companies
from fighting government requests for surveillance assistance.

250. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B), 2709(b) (2012); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(4), 1805b(e)
(repealed 2008), 1881a(h)(3), 1885a(a)(2), (3) (2012); supra Part III.C. (discussing the statutory
enactment of the corporate avatar dynamic); see also ROCKEFELLER, supra note 210, at 12.
251. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2011).
252. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 201, 122 Stat. 2436, 2469
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a(a)(4)(A)(i) (2012)) (immunizing companies for
actions taken from September 11, 2001, through January 17, 2007).
253. S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 9, 11; In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 671 F.3d at
892–93.
254. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 671 F.3d at 893 (“[I]f litigation were
allowed to proceed against persons allegedly assisting in such activities, ‘the private sector might
be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the future.’” (quoting S. REP. NO.
110-209, at 10)). Jon Michaels proposes a surveillance regime in which corporations would play
a highly formalized role, complete with compliance and disclosure rules, as opposed to the
“informal” role it took in the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Michaels, supra note 89, at 950–65.
Private companies take on both Executive implementation functions and congressional oversight
functions. Id. at 959–61. Among his many proposals, Michaels suggests immunity would induce
corporations to participate in the program. Id. at 961–63.
255. 154 CONG. REC. S6381 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold); see
also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 40, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 133 S. Ct. 421 (2012) (mem.)
(No. 11-1200), 2012 WL 1097105, at *40 (arguing that the statute’s grant of unfettered
discretion to the Attorney General to certify that a provider merited immunity upset the
separation of powers and empowered the Executive “to pressure telecommunications carriers to
refrain from advocating the privacy rights of their customers”).
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The debate over tech company immunity also evidenced a strain of the
corporate avatar dynamic. For example, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence attributed its support of limits on the scope of immunity to
providers’ “essential role in ensuring that the Government complies with
statutory requirements before collecting information that may impact the
privacy interests of U.S. citizens.”256 And Senator Patrick Leahy insisted the
statute “would subvert the gatekeeping role that FISA contemplates for the
providers.”257 Whatever the merits of the argument that tech companies serve
as a check on government abuse, statutory immunity reduces the likelihood
that tech companies will resist government requests for assistance.258
B. COUNTERARGUMENT: THE MARKET AS A PRIVACY MOTIVATOR
Supporters of the corporate avatar dynamic might point to the
marketplace’s response to the Snowden leaks. The economic backlash has
been significant.259 Since news reports emerged of the tech companies’
involvement in U.S. government surveillance, estimates of losses in the U.S.
cloud computing industry range from $21.5 billion to $180 billion.260 As a
result, companies have sought to win back the public’s trust and made efforts

256. S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 10.
257. PATRICK LEAHY, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978 AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-258, at 20 (2008); see also Heidi Kitrosser, It Came
from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1430–31
(2010) (citing arguments concerning tech companies’ government abuse-checking function).
258. It might be argued that tech companies act in the public interest, and therefore, their
assistance with government surveillance justifies the same protections that state actors enjoy. See
supra Part V.A.3 (discussing tech companies’ government-like status); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 132
S. Ct. 1657, 1667–68 (2012) (holding that a private attorney hired to conduct an investigative
interview for the government was entitled to claim qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Michaels, supra note 89, at 962 n.268. Of course, if considered government actors, corporations’
conduct would be subject to the limits of the Constitution. Jack Balkin has argued that it is
precisely because the Constitution does not limit private behavior that the government involves
the private sector in its surveillance. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 16–17.
259. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowdenhurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html (describing the reluctance of foreign nations to use
American companies’ tech services because of their susceptibility to, and compliance with, U.S.
government surveillance).
260. SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 30, at 32–33 (arguing online information’s vulnerability
requires companies to ensure privacy and maintain user trust, or else the product will be
abandoned); Nicole Perlroth & Vindu Goel, Internet Firms Step Up Efforts to Stop Spying, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/technology/internet-firms-step-up-effortsto-stop-spying.html (citing research showing cloud computing losses could reach $180 billion
through 2016 as a result of NSA surveillance); Andrea Peterson, NSA Snooping Could Cost U.S. Tech
Companies $35 Billion over Three Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/nsa-snooping-could-cost-u-s-tech-companies-35-billion-overthree-years (reporting that non-U.S. companies have cancelled contracts with U.S. cloud providers
due to the NSA leaks, and that cloud providers may lose between $21.5 to $35 billion from 2013
through 2016).
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to improve encryption,261 publicize their efforts to withstand government
surveillance,262 limit their compliance with government data requests,263 and
tighten their privacy policies.264 The Electronic Frontier Foundation credits
these developments with corporations’ improvements in resisting
government requests for user data and general user advocacy.265
Moreover, globalization requires that companies serving customers in
numerous countries meet those nations’ laws that are often more protective
of privacy.266 Thus, corporations may need to improve their users’
information security to placate European regulators and other nations.267
261. See Andrea Peterson, Privacy Is Tech’s Latest Marketing Strategy, WASH. POST (Sept. 26,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/26/privacy-is-techslatest-marketing-strategy/ (describing the marketing of products to appeal to privacy concerns);
David E. Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone Locks Out N.S.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-outthe-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html (describing Apple’s and Google’s default encryption
in the iPhone and Android, which make it impossible for the companies to comply with orders
requiring the disclosure of users’ content data); James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Speech at the Brookings Institution: Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and
Public Safety on a Collision Course? (Oct. 16, 2014), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/
speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course (concluding
that Apple’s and Google’ encryption of their devices “suggest that the post-Snowden pendulum
has swung too far in one direction,” while acknowledging that encryption will not affect data
stored in the cloud or preclude access to metadata).
262. See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Internet Giants Erect Barriers to Spy Agencies, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/07/technology/internet-giants-erectbarriers-to-spy-agencies.html (describing tech companies’ litigation and ultimate deal with the
government over disclosing the number of FISA requests).
263. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 237 (noting that Facebook, Twitter, and Google “will no
longer hand over their customers’ data without a search warrant”).
264. See, e.g., Vindu Goel, Some Privacy, Please? Facebook, Under Pressure, Gets the Message, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/technology/facebook-offersprivacy-checkup-to-all-1-28-billion-users.html (describing Facebook’s changes to privacy policies,
including a default privacy setting and an individual privacy checkup for users).
265. See NATE CARDOZO ET AL, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING
YOUR DATA FROM GOVERNMENT REQUESTS: THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION’S FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS’ PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES REGARDING
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO USER DATA 7 (2014), available at https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/
15/who-has-your-back-2014-govt-data-requests.pdf (attributing the “major improvements in
industry standards for informing users about government data requests, publishing transparency
reports, and fighting for the user in Congress” to revelations about “a close relationship between
tech companies and [the government]”).
266. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Right to Be Forgotten? Not That Easy, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/business/international/on-the-internet-the-right-to-forget-vs-theright-to-know.html (describing Google’s efforts to comply with the Court of European Union’s
decision that the “right to be forgotten” outlined in the European Union’s 1995 Privacy Directive
required Google to grant individuals’ requests to remove inaccurate and irrelevant personal
information); see also Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
267. Michael J. Geary & Kevin A. Lees, NSA Scandal Will Follow Obama to Europe, NAT’L INT.
(June 14, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/nsa-scandal-follows-obama-europe8602 (noting that service providers may be subjected to European lawsuits and regulation);
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Government officials in India are prohibited from using email connected to
servers in the United States.268 And Germany and Brazil have warned that they
may only permit data to go through local providers.269
Since the Snowden revelations, tech companies have engaged in highly
publicized litigation against the government over surveillance.270 For
example, Facebook has challenged sealed search warrants for 381 user
accounts, including their photos, likes, messages, and comments.271 Facebook
also attacked the warrants’ nondisclosure provisions, contending that “[t]he
people whose accounts are the targets of the searches deserve the opportunity
to contest the seizure of their information in advance.”272 The focus on notice
to the user reflected the company’s appreciation of its own limitations in
approximating individual users’ reactions to the government’s acquiring their
personal information.
Microsoft has similarly publicized its efforts to quash a warrant for email
contents, which Microsoft argues are stored in a Dublin, Ireland, data center
and are therefore outside the federal courts’ jurisdiction.273 AT&T, Apple,
Cisco, and Verizon filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Microsoft.274

Sanger & Perlroth, supra note 262 (noting a decline in hardware companies’ business in Asia,
Brazil, and Europe since the Snowden leaks); see also Mark Scott, Where Tech Giants Protect Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/sunday-review/where-techgiants-protect-privacy.html (attributing Silicon Valley companies’ privacy improvements to
European regulations).
268. See Perlroth & Goel, supra note 260.
269. See id.; Sanger & Perlroth, supra note 262.
270. The most immediate litigious response by tech companies was the tech companies’
lawsuit to permit more detailed reporting of FISA and NSL requests by the government. See, e.g.,
Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.’s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate
Information About FISA Orders, supra note 169, at 4. Tech companies have also sought legislative
reform of NSA surveillance. See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Facebook, Apple Make Year-End Lobbying Push to
Curb NSA Spying, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2014-11-14/companies-call-on-senate-to-pass-bill-curbing-nsa-powers.html.
271. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Bulk Search
Warrants and Strike Nondisclosure Provisions, In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook,
Inc. and Dated July 23, 2013, No. 30207-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013); Vindu Goel & James C.
McKinley Jr., Forced to Hand Over Data, Facebook Files Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/technology/facebook-battles-manhattan-da-over-warrants-foruser-data.html; James C. McKinley Jr., Court Weighs Facebook’s Right to Challenge Search Warrants on
Users’ Behalf, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/nyregion/courtweighs-facebooks-right-to-challenge-search-warrants-on-users-behalf.html.
272. Memorandum of Law in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Bulk Search
Warrants and Strike Nondisclosure Provisions, supra note 271, at 7.
273. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Joseph Ax, Microsoft Ordered by U.S.
Judge to Submit Customer’s Emails from Abroad, REUTERS (July 31, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/us-usa-tech-warrants-idUSKBN0G024I20140731; Brad Smith,
Op-Ed., We’re Fighting the Feds over Your Email, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/brad-smith-were-fighting-the-feds-over-your-email-1406674616.
274. Ax, supra note 273.
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Though much of the rhetoric focuses on privacy, the tech companies’
aggressive litigation stance is no doubt stimulated in part by customers’
perceptions that their data are vulnerable to U.S. surveillance, regardless of
where the data are stored and the fact that they may opt to use different
services.275
It may be too early to tell whether the market will compel tech companies
to make long-term changes to their privacy policies and compliance with
government requests for user data. First, notwithstanding many of the protests
over surveillance and inadequate privacy protections, many foreign users
remain “hooked” or prefer to use U.S. companies’ services.276 Second, legal
requirements, in particular nondisclosure, may prevent companies from
strengthening privacy and other user protections from government data
requests.277 Third, companies may choose not to alter their current
relationship with the government given their many economic and entrenched
mutually beneficial connections.278 Fourth, companies may not want to
appear unpatriotic by increasing user privacy protection at a perceived
expense of national security.279 Finally, many companies may announce
changes to their privacy policies in the Snowden aftermath, without making
any long-term alterations. Privacy policies are notoriously malleable;
companies unilaterally change the terms frequently.280
But let us accept that external forces presage a change in tech companies’
compliance with government requests for user data and surveillance
assistance. Even a radical transformation of the intelligence-industrial
complex cannot save the corporate avatar dynamic. As the next Part argues,
inserting the private tech company as the voice and conscience of the people
wreaks havoc with the history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

275. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Verizon Commc’ns’ Motion to Participate
as Amicus Curiae and Microsoft’s Motion to Vacate Search Warrant at 1–2, In re Warrant to Search
a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 466
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014), ECF No. 29 (noting warrants’ potential “enormous detrimental impact
on the international business of American companies, on international relations, and on
privacy.”); Ax, supra note 273.
276. See Mark Scott, Principles Are No Match for Europe’s Love of U.S. Web Titans, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/technology/principles-are-no-match-for-europeslove-of-us-tech-titans-like-amazon-and-facebook.html (noting that U.S. tech companies constitute
“seven of the [ten] most visited websites in Europe”).
277. See supra Part IV.B; see also Michaels, supra note 89, at 940–41.
278. See supra Part V.A.1; see also Michaels, supra note 89, at 940–42.
279. Michaels, supra note 89, at 941–42.
280. Id. at 941. In addition, purported improvements to privacy policies may easily sway
people without resulting in much change at all. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in
Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1066 n.222 (2012) (noting that many
people assume the fact of a privacy policy indicates that a company will not share their data with
third parties).
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C. THE NORMATIVE WEAKNESSES OF THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC
1. The Fourth Amendment as a Check on Government
In addition to protecting privacy interests, the Fourth Amendment
affords “a means of preserving the people’s authority over government—the
people’s sovereign right to determine how and when government may intrude
into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.”281 Canvassing preconstitutional history, Raymond Ku argues that the Fourth Amendment is best
viewed as “an outgrowth and complement to the limitations placed upon
executive power through the Constitution’s separation of powers.”282
Akhil Reed Amar interprets the Fourth Amendment’s phrase “the
people” as demonstrating a “concern with the agency problem of protecting
the people generally from self-interested government policy.”283 The Bill of
Rights limits government officials (the people’s “agents”) from governing
against the interests of the people (the “principals”).284 Under this holistic
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, the Framers intended for “the
people”—in connection with the exercise of the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury—to determine the reasonableness of searches in civil lawsuits for
trespass against government officials.285
The Framers viewed judicially-issued warrants, on the other hand, with
skepticism. Warrants were unlikely to deter “government overreaching”
because they issued from a solitary government official whose decision was
made in secret, without notice or an adversarial proceeding.286 The Framers
thus envisioned a “populist Fourth Amendment.”287 This populist
perspective—which stresses accountability and balancing of government
powers—makes vesting the power to challenge Fourth Amendment violations
in tech companies, instead of “the people,” constitutionally incoherent.
2. English History of Corporate Searches and Seizures
Scholars and courts have frequently looked to English history and case
law on the legislation of broad and general search-and-seizure powers,
particularly general warrants, in explicating the Fourth Amendment.288 But
281. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002).
282. Id. at 1332–33; see also id. at 1343 (identifying as important the principle that the Fourth
Amendment “is intended to limit executive power and discretion”).
283. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 68 (1998).
284. Id. at xiii.
285. Id. at 68, 70–75; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 10–17 (1997); Ku, supra note 281, at 1338–39.
286. AMAR, supra note 283, at 69; see also id. at 70 (observing that government could also
“forum shop,” seeking out the sympathetic magistrate judge for a warrant).
287. Id. at 73.
288. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886) (“[I]t may be confidently
asserted that [Entick’s] propositions were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth
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the role that private corporations played in these searches has received less
attention. Though the Fourth Amendment does not refer to searches by
private corporations on behalf of the government, the Framers were doubtless
aware that the expansive search-and-seizures powers originated with the
authorization of the Stationers’ Company to conduct searches to support both
the government licensing system that imposed censorship and prior restraints
and the company’s monopoly on the printing industry.289
In 1566, the King’s Council decreed that officers from the Stationers’
Company had the authority to search all locations, open all packages of papers
and books, seize books violating any statutes or proclamations, and receive
half of the proceeds from fines levied by the king.290 Company officials were
particularly inclined to search in their own interest.291 Guild members that
were granted exclusive printing licenses often received the related authority
to enter and search “all suspected places” to maintain their monopoly.292
From 1623 to 1629, Stationers exercised their search powers and seized more
than 20,000 texts, including Bibles, from Cambridge University.293
The Stationers’ Company’s expansive search-and-seizure powers played a
vital part in censoring and suppressing sedition and dissent, reflecting its role
“as an executive tool of the Government.”294 During the 17th century, the

Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was
meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.”); Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B.) [812] (appeal taken from C.B.) (holding in a trespass action against government officials
and messengers that general warrants and the resulting search of homes and seizure of materials
critical of the King were “contrary to the genius of the law of England”); Wilkes v. Wood, (1763)
98 Eng. 489 (K.B.) (appeal taken from C.B.); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 22–50 (1937)
(describing early English history of search and seizure).
289. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717,
724–25 (1961) (describing Stationers’ Company’s search-and-seizure powers in furtherance of
the Tudor licensing system); id. at 729 (“This history was, of course, part of the intellectual matrix
within which our own constitutional fabric was shaped. The Bill of Rights was fashioned against
the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an
instrument for stifling liberty of expression.”); WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 58–60 (2009); FREDERICK SEATON SIEBERT,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476–1776: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT
CONTROL 374–76 (Univ. of Ill. Press, Urbana, 1965) (1952); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual
Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 320 (2004).
290. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 22–23 (1966) (describing the company’s regulations requiring
that printing houses be subject to a weekly search by printers and that printers be made easily
accessible for searches); LASSON, supra note 288, at 24–25; see also Marcus, 367 U.S. at 724–29;
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 670 (1834).
291. CUDDIHY, supra note 289, at 92–93.
292. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Id.
294. CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403–1959, at 70 (1960); see
CUDDIHY, supra note 289, at 59; LANDYNSKI, supra note 290, at 20–23; see also Marcus, 367 U.S. at
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company’s search powers broadened beyond searches of printing houses to
include any suspected locations, without geographic limitation.295 The
English government manipulated the Stationers’ Company’s monopolistic
aims to serve its own ends. This exploitation crystallizes the incongruity of
appointing powerful corporations to guard against government surveillance
today.
3. Constitution-Era Distrust of Corporations
Colonial history also suggests that the Framers viewed private
corporations with “distrust or disfavor.”296 American Revolution history
reflects the colonists’ frustration at the admixture of government
overreaching and corporate dominance.297 Indeed, the Boston Tea Party was
the apotheosis of early American resentment of unfettered governmentcorporate monopolistic power—a rejection of both the East India Company’s
government-granted monopoly on American tea and onerous taxes.298
At the time of the founding, many called for a provision, explicitly
prohibiting corporate monopolies.299 Thomas Jefferson argued for a
“restriction against monopolies” within the Bill of Rights.300 For Jefferson,
guarding against the encroachment on liberty by the Legislative and
Executive branches entailed restricting corporate monopolies.
724 (describing Stationers’ Company’s incorporation and searching authority as “a principal
instrument for the enforcement of the Tudor licensing system”).
295. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 725–27; CUDDIHY, supra note 289, at 59, 173–74, 304–05, 427.
296. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2,
at 7 (rev. vol. 2006); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 426–27
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing early American
criticism of corporations).
297. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of
Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1008 (2013) (describing how “England’s
monopolistic trade laws led to protest by the colonists and eventually the American Revolution”);
Jonas V. Anderson, Note, Regulating Corporations the American Way: Why Exhaustive Rules and Just
Deserts Are the Mainstay of U.S. Corporate Governance, 57 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1100–01 (2008).
298. NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW THE EAST INDIA
COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL 110–15 (2d ed. 2012); HARLOW GILES UNGER,
AMERICAN TEMPEST: HOW THE BOSTON TEA PARTY SPARKED A REVOLUTION 159–60 (2011);
Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 297, at 1008 (describing the Boston Tea Party as “an act against
the British government and the East India Company, which had a monopoly over tea importations
to the colonies”).
299. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 297, at 1009–15 (describing the opposition to
monopolies at the time of the nation’s founding); id. at 1013 (noting that six states sought a ban
on monopolies in the U.S. Constitution). But see Nachbar, supra note 289, at 344 (“[T]here is no
indication that the concern over the possibility of federal monopolies was widespread.”).
300. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 5 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 368, 371 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904); see also THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL
PROTECTION: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME “PEOPLE”—AND YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 89–91 (2d ed.
2010) (describing Jefferson’s continued calls for freedom from monopolies); Calabresi &
Leibowitz, supra note 297, at 1009–12. But see Nachbar, supra note 289, at 341 (describing
Jefferson’s views as “extremist[ ]” and “hardly representative of the views of the Framers”).
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Although James Madison did not support an anti-monopoly amendment
to the Constitution, he strongly disfavored monopolies.301 In describing his
conception of republican government, Madison wrote that it must:
[B]e derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a
handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a
delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans,
and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.302
But inserting corporations as the peoples’ avatars hardly realizes the Framers’
populist objectives.
Although today there is far greater concern over private monopolies than
government-sponsored ones, the general worry is the same: corruption and
abuses that benefit a private few over the general public.303 Given the Framers’
awareness of the Stationers’ Company’s history and antipathy toward
corporations, it is hard to conceive of their assent to a Fourth Amendment
that relies on corporate challenges on behalf of the people.304
4. Fourth Amendment Minority Viewpoint Protection
Another purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to afford shelter to
political, religious, and ideological minorities.”305 Leaving it to tech
companies’ discretion to oppose government requests for information
pertaining to minority interests hardly supports that purpose. While tech
companies, particularly social media, may speak “in the language of freedom
and liberation,” Evgeny Morozov argues that the idealistic rhetoric “allows
vested interests to disguise what essentially amounts to advertising for their
commercial products.”306 At bottom, a company is understandably motivated

301. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 297, at 1014–16.
302. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 193 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
303. See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 297, at 1056–57 (describing the evolution of
concern from government grants of exclusive privileges to one of “crony capitalism”).
304. Thomas Nachbar cautions against inferring a constitutional norm from some of the
Framers’ anti-monopoly statements. Nachbar, supra note 289, at 344–45 (arguing that there is a
lack of “‘demonstrable consensus’ that an originalist would expect to see before inferring an
effect on the meaning of the Constitution” (quoting Edwin Meese, III, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Construing the Constitution: Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers
Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 26 (1985))). Rather than proposing a
narrow anti-monopoly constitutional norm, I adopt Amar’s conception of a “populist Fourth
Amendment,” which integrates the historical background of skepticism of corporate monopolies
and their role in searches and seizures. AMAR, supra note 283, at 73; see also Marcus v. Search
Warrants of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).
305. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141 (2012); see also AMAR, supra note 283, at 67–68.
306. EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM 304
(2011).
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by financial profit. The messianic zeal of Internet futurists and Google’s
“don’t be evil”307 incantation should not dispel that notion.
The financial motive means a tech company focuses on giving the
majority of the public what it wants. As Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg puts
it, “We view it as our role in the system to constantly be innovating and be
updating what our system is to reflect what the current social norms are.”308
Mirroring the norms on privacy and tolerance of government or corporate
intrusion and surveillance may be good business, but it is not the proper basis
for protecting constitutional rights. As corporate entities that are accountable
to their shareholders and that seek to serve as much of the majority and the
mainstream as possible, tech companies cannot fulfill the Fourth
Amendment’s aims as avatars for minority expression and information.
5. The Corporate Fourth Amendment Right
Over the past two centuries, corporations have taken on the vestiges of
personhood, including individual rights provided in the Constitution.309 But
unlike the expansion of First Amendment rights, a corporation’s Fourth
Amendment rights remain limited.310 The Supreme Court “has recognized
that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself
to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context.”311
Hence, commercial property owners do not enjoy the same expectation of

307. Samuel Gibbs, Google Has “Outgrown” Its 14-Year Old Mission Statement, Says Larry Page,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2014, 9:26 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/03/
larry-page-google-dont-be-evil-sergey-brin.
308. Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy Is Over, READWRITE (Jan.
9, 2010), http://readwrite.com/2010/01/09/facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_
is_ov (quoting Mark Zuckerberg) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The
Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1525, 1535 n.48 (2012).
309. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that a
“corporate identity” may not restrict its First Amendment Right to free speech). See generally Carl
J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990)
(describing the evolution of the rights corporations enjoy).
310. See Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG
2D 77, 83 (2010) (“Right now, corporations have virtually no Fourth Amendment rights where it
really counts.”); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1016, 1037 (1995) (“Fourth Amendment law protects corporations, but only nominally.”).
But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“[E]xtending Fourth
Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others
associated with the company.”); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“[W]e do not wish to
be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); Palmat Int’l, Inc. v. Holder, No. 1220229-CIV, 2013 WL 594695, at *4 n.5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (“It is unclear whether the right
to informational privacy extends to corporations.”).
311. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
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privacy as do individual homeowners.312 And subpoenas for corporate records
often do not offend the Fourth Amendment.313
In addressing the reasonableness of corporate subpoenas, the Supreme
Court expounded on the reasons for a corporation’s adumbrated right to
privacy:
[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the
enjoyment of a right to privacy. They are endowed with public
attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which
they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal
Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an
enhanced measure of regulation.314
Justice O’Connor more recently explained that because it “is an artificial
being,” a corporation “is not entitled to purely personal guarantees whose
historic function . . . has been limited to the protection of individuals.”315 As
a result, according to Justice O’Connor, a corporation does not have a right
to privacy.316 As the Court has repeatedly made clear, corporations bear little
resemblance to individuals and their relationship to the government is also
decidedly different from that of the people to the government. Rather,
corporations bear some similarity to the government’s functions and also owe
their very existence to the government. Such a description of the corporation
is hard to reconcile with the notion of corporations as the people’s avatars.317
6. The Dangerous Power of the Private Few
When the Fourth Amendment is viewed as “a way to constrain the power
of the state to regulate,” leaving enforcement of the right against
312. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 (1986) (citing Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981)).
313. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651–53 (1950); see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 66 (1974) (noting that the government’s “requirements for the reporting of
domestic financial transactions abridge no Fourth Amendment right of the banks themselves”).
314. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652 (citations omitted); see also Hale, 201 U.S. at 75
(explaining that as a creature of the state a corporation may be more subject to searches).
315. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and
for whom our Constitution was established.”). But see Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (“A corporation
is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”).
316. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 284.
317. If, along the same rationale of Citizens United, Christopher Slobogin conjectures, the
Supreme Court accorded greater Fourth Amendment protections to corporate records, then it
might be harder for the government to obtain a corporation’s customer’s personal data.
Slobogin, supra note 310, at 85. But Slobogin doubts that corporate agitation will ultimately
precipitate change in the law. Id. at 85–86.
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unreasonable searches and seizures to a handful of companies is deeply
troubling.318 The small number of tech companies that dominate
telecommunications and the Internet make them more susceptible to
interests that do not favor privacy protection or government oversight.319
Tim Wu has made a similar observation about free speech, contending
that the “‘speech industry’—as we might term any information industry—
once centralized, becomes an easy target for external independent actors with
strong reasons of their own for limiting speech.”320 As Wu argues, “[I]n the
United States, it is industrial structure that determines the limits of free
speech.”321
Industrial structure may well dictate the contours of privacy. At some
level, it is simple mathematics. Because of the immense power that just a few
telecommunications carriers and Internet companies hold over our data, the
government does not need many entities to undertake large-scale
surveillance.322 As a result, there is less opportunity for challenges by entities.
Moreover, the powerful positions held by a Google or Amazon owe much to
relationships with the government that they may not want to risk over requests
for consumer data.323 In addition, just a few powerful companies may defeat
users’ expectations of privacy from government intrusion by drafting
contracts that afford the companies broad rights of access, collection, and
analysis to users’ contents and data.324
This dynamic is in and of itself a threat to democratic accountability and
the Fourth Amendment. The widespread use of information technologies
that are owned by a few companies reduces the checks and balances that

318. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 213; see also Stuntz, supra note 310, at 1026.
319. See Farhad Manjoo, The Great Tech War of 2012: Apple, Facebook, Google, and Amazon Battle
for the Future of the Innovation Economy, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.fast
company.com/1784824/great-tech-war-2012 (describing Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Google as the most important companies determining the economy’s agenda).
320. WU, supra note 238, at 122–23; see also id. at 273 (arguing that Google and Apple “are
determining how Americans and the rest of the world will share information”).
321. Id. at 121; see also Rosen, supra note 308, at 1536–37 (observing that tech companies
may remove material that offends some portion of the community without violating the First
Amendment); David Goldman, Google: The Reluctant Censor of the Internet, CNN MONEY (Jan. 4,
2015, 9:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/04/technology/google-censorship/index.
html (describing Google’s removal of content and links at the request of countries, including the
United States).
322. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 117–18 (2008).
323. See supra Part V.A.1. The relative low cost and secrecy of technology-aided surveillance
for the government also raise concerns over checks and balances. United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); Katherine
J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change,
70 MD. L. REV. 614, 674 (2011).
324. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f the ISP expresses an
intention to ‘audit, inspect, and monitor’ its subscriber’s emails, that might be enough to render
an expectation of privacy unreasonable.” (citations omitted)).
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government had to overcome in the past to conduct surveillance.325 Today,
the co-option (or cooperation) of one entity can effect extensive
surveillance.326 Similarly, the fewer companies that hold sway over the
Internet and telecommunications, the easier it is for the government to
leverage the companies’ commercial interests and induce them to make
changes to the technologies that will facilitate surveillance.327
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE CORPORATE AVATAR DYNAMIC FALLACY
Accepting that corporate avatars will not advocate for individuals’ privacy
rights and that the corporate avatar dynamic undermines separation of
powers, what is the solution? How can individual users obtain their own
agency? The clearest answer is to provide users with notice of the
government’s request for their information, be it content or non-content
data.
The right to notice, however, must follow from a change in
understanding of individuals’ relationship to their data and how we define
privacy. First, the third-party doctrine should be limited by affording Fourth
Amendment protection to some non-content data and eliminating the
conceit that disclosure of personal data to tech companies is voluntary.
Second, individual users, not simply the companies that acquire and
analyze their data, should retain a proprietary right in their data. Based on
the property interest in data, individuals should receive notice before the
government acquires their data from third-party corporations.
Third, the proprietary and resulting privacy interests should be
communicated as much as possible and at the earliest stage by individuals’
machines to government and corporations’ machines. Securing individual
privacy and limits on government overreach in the big data era require
changes in the way people, companies, and government interact through
technological devices. Because of the countless ways in which we share data
through tech companies (and the government) it is nearly impossible to know
how and when data are used and when notice might be warranted. By
operationalizing these interests through automation at the front end,
corporations and the government will know what information may be
obtained and what information may require the intervention of a court.
Finally, as an adjunct to the automated process, greater transparency is
necessary to better understand how both companies and the government use
individuals’ data.

325. ZITTRAIN, supra note 322, at 117–18.
326. Id.
327. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 61–62; see also id. at 80 (“Commerce has a purpose, and
government can exploit that to its own end. It will, increasingly, and more frequently, and when
it does, the character of the Net will change.”).
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A. NOTICE
Providing notice to the user when the government requests data is
necessary to realize the populist and government-limiting purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Even at the third-party doctrine’s origins, Justice William
Brennan decried the lack of notice as “a fatal constitutional defect.”328
Notice affords individuals the opportunity to challenge requests
themselves or in conjunction with the company. Usually, the user will have a
greater stake in the personal information at issue and thus, be more
knowledgeable and more incentivized to challenge the government.329
When the government seeks records from a third-party company, there
is usually no concern that evidence will be destroyed.330 Records for which
businesses often hold copies or can easily duplicate the data should not
therefore present a problem.
There are, however, instances in which providing notice could harm law
enforcement and security interests.331 But, as Chief Justice Roberts has
acknowledged, “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”332 Where security and law
enforcement concerns necessitate secrecy, the government should be
required to obtain a warrant. In other exigent circumstances, the law allows
for warrantless searches and other mechanisms for preserving data while
waiting for a warrant.333
B. LIMITING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Justice Sotomayor’s exhortation in Jones to “reconsider” 334 the third-party
doctrine is particularly compelling in the big data era, in which (1) big data
is employed to discover intimate and personal habits and beliefs based on
non-content information; and (2) disclosure of personal information to third
parties is the price—not the voluntary choice—of participation in society.
Applying Smith to its logical conclusion today would make the third-party
doctrine not the exception but the rule, and eviscerate Fourth Amendment
application to countless data bearing on personal and intimate matters.

328. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 448 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
329. See State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 35 (N.J. 2008); CARDOZO ET AL., supra note 142, at 10.
330. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 305, at 134.
331. See, e.g., Reid, 945 A.2d at 36. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Internet users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information they give to the ISP, but
did not require that notice be provided to users due to concerns that evidence might be
destroyed. Id. at 28, 36. The court’s reasoning suggests that in instances where the third-party
company has copies or back-ups of the data, notice should be required. See id. at 36.
332. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
333. See id. at 2483–84; SCHULHOFER, supra note 305, at 134.
334. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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1. Non-Content Data Exception
The third-party doctrine should not apply to a person’s “non-content”
data. The data at issue in Smith do not compare to the “quantity and variety”
of big data, or to the “analytics” that may be applied to the data.335 The Smith
Court could not have contemplated “that the traces of digital data left today
as a matter of routine can be reassembled to reveal intimate personal
details.”336
At the heart of the content/non-content distinction is an archaic conceit
that content information encompasses information more deserving of
privacy. But to the extent big data permits an understanding of a person’s
individual behavior over lengthy periods of time, it is just as intrusive as
accessing a person’s communication contents.337 However the information
may be defined, the Internet will contain even more personal information in
the near future, monitoring all our activities, from the beat of our hearts to
videos we watch.338
Cases that have held that metadata do not merit Fourth Amendment
protection have focused on that information’s purported imprecision; the
courts predicate their holdings on the idea that the information only serves
as fodder for “educated guesses” and speculation about the contents of
communications.339 But the ever-increasing use of communication devices
and capabilities of data analytics render the content/non-content distinction
obsolete in terms of guarding protection.
As Judge Garaufis recognized, “there is no meaningful Fourth
Amendment distinction between content and other forms of information, the
disclosure of which to the Government would be equally intrusive and reveal
information society values as private.”340 Judge Leon similarly emphasized that
the amount and quality of big data analytics means “[r]ecords that once would
have revealed a few scattered tiles of information about a person now reveal
an entire mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person’s

335. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 19.
336. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES
49 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_
report_may_1_2014.pdf; see also id. at 34 (noting that “with the advent of big data,” metadata,
such as originating and terminating phone numbers, may be as revealing as the phone
conversation and merit the same privacy protections).
337. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (observing that website visits and search terms can reveal
private interests and that CSLI can reveal a person’s whereabouts).
338. See Quentin Hardy, They Have Seen the Future of the Internet, and It Is Dark, N.Y. TIMES BITS
(July 5, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/they-have-seen-the-futureof-the-Internet-and-it-is-dark/.
339. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007).
340. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5
(1979)).
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life.”341 Thus, the government’s acquiring and analyzing metadata and other
“non-content” may be as great a privacy intrusion as any surveillance of
“content” data.342 The advances of big data therefore require an exception to
the third-party doctrine for non-content data as well.
2. Involuntary Provision of the Personal Data Exception
The third-party doctrine in the big data era is also hard to justify based
on its original voluntariness rationale. In an increasingly connected world,
choosing not to provide personal information via credit cards, cell phones,
the Internet, and other media through a corporate third-party intermediary
is not a viable option.343 Access to the Internet is critical to financial success
and income mobility.344 Thus, the use of Gmail, the iPhone call, or the
purchase on Amazon cannot be characterized as voluntary; rather, they are
necessary to taking part and attaining success in society.345 Similarly,
Facebook, Twitter, cell phones, text messaging, and email are indispensable
to communicating with friends and colleagues.346
Moreover, the still untapped uses and analyses of data suggest it is
impracticable to know what information one voluntarily discloses. Indeed, our
information that is subject to data analytics and data mining might be
considered “less voluntary” than our content. We do not appreciate or
understand how those data might be interpreted and analyzed because the
algorithm for such pattern recognition has not been created yet.347
Users also should not be viewed as voluntarily acceding to the disclosure
of their data pursuant to the notice and consent provisions of a provider

341. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012)); see also Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) (discussing
Klayman), appeal docketed, No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. July 1, 2014).
342. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 19 (“There is no
reason to believe that metadata raise fewer privacy concerns than the data they describe.”).
343. A privacy industry has, however, emerged. But the costs of encryption, privacy shields,
and disposable email addresses and phone numbers are substantial, prompting one author to term
privacy a “luxury good.” Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html.
344. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The New Digital Divide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/opinion/sunday/internet-access-and-the-new-divide.html.
345. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 305, at 132 (contending that the third-party doctrine cases
present “in effect, the option to withdraw from normal community life”).
346. See id. at 131 (“Once we acknowledge that electronic media have become essential for
maintaining personal relationships, the decision to use them is not ‘voluntary,’ and those who
send email have not in any meaningful sense ‘chosen’ to assume the risk of government spying.”).
347. Cf. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 24–25; id. at
44 (explaining that “the non-obvious nature of big data’s products of analysis make it all but
impossible for an individual to make fine-grained privacy choices for every new situation or app”).
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contract.348 Rarely will users read or comprehend the potentially thousands of
privacy policies they sign that set forth the ways their data may be used.349 And
individuals are not well-positioned to negotiate with tech companies over the
terms and conditions of a contract and privacy protections.350
In making an exception to the third-party doctrine for information
conveyed through intermediaries, lower courts implicitly recognize the lack
of choice or voluntariness in many modern communications.351 But the
intermediary exception also appears rooted in the content/non-content
distinction, applying only to intermediaries that deliver and receive
communication but do not access or analyze them.352 Yet the ubiquity of
collection and analysis of email contents, for example, calls into question the
force and scope of the intermediary exception.353 The indispensability of
intermediaries to a person’s communications, on the other hand, suggests a
solitary and solid basis for excluding information conveyed through them
from the third-party doctrine. It is not feasible to communicate without some
sort of intermediary.354
The animating rationales of the content and intermediary exceptions to
the third-party doctrine reveal that these bright lines are quite porous today.
The advent of big data means that non-content information we previously
thought impersonal and imprecise can provide a portrait of a person not
unlike that of communications contents. And the ubiquity of technological
intermediaries that store and analyze our communications data are no less
necessary to our participation in society and self-expression than the third
parties that have conveyed our communications without accessing and
studying them. But even if we do away with the third-party doctrine, it is
unclear whether the individual retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in
various data under the Fourth Amendment. Such a determination requires a
new conceptualization of peoples’ relationship to data and the interests and
protections that flow therefrom.

348. See id. at 38. The President’s Council has criticized the notice and consent regime as
“unworkable and ineffective” because it makes the individual, as opposed to the company,
responsible for his privacy protection. Id. at 40.
349. Id. at 38.
350. Id. (characterizing the asymmetry between a user and provider as “a kind of market
failure”); see also LANIER, supra note 39, at 207 (noting that “network effects” make it unlikely a
user can choose another network once a critical mass has selected a particular network).
351. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Emails must pass
through an ISP’s servers to reach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the functional
equivalent of a post office or a telephone company.”).
352. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1038 (2010) (“[T]he third-party doctrine has not been extended to intermediaries that
merely send and receive contents without needing to access or analyze those communications.”).
353. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
354. See Hardy, supra note 338.
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C. THE PEOPLE’S PROPRIETARY RIGHT TO DATA
In order that people may guard their own privacy and oversee the
government, we must recognize a proprietary relationship between the
individual and the data that she creates. By re-conceptualizing the individual’s
relationship to her data, she retains her personal agency, as opposed to
forfeiting her rights to the corporate avatar. Most important, because of her
property interest in her data, due process considerations require that before
infringing that interest through collection and analysis, the government must
afford her notice and an opportunity to challenge the infringement (i.e., the
surveillance).355 To construct this notice regime, I advocate building upon
proposals relating to individual ownership of digital data and automated
privacy preferences.
1. Monetization of Personal Data
Jaron Lanier proposes a system in which each person is “the commercial
owner of any data that can be measured from that person’s state or
behavior.”356 An individual may choose particular transaction and privacy
policies, setting a price for the use of her data.357 Corporate and government
use of even the minutest data for a large data set and resulting predictive
algorithms would occasion “nanopayments” determined by the level of
contribution and value.358
Commercializing privacy rights may not succeed in realizing some of the
Fourth Amendment’s original purposes. Similar to private companies, the
government would pay for the use of a person’s data.359 But rather than
limiting government overreach, monetization of privacy rights might
incentivize individuals’ capitulation of these interests. Under any system,
people may elect to consent to a government search. The promise of a
financial return, however, may transform the passive citizen into an active
seller, fundamentally altering the relationship between the people and the
government.360
355. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972).
356. LANIER, supra note 39, at 20; see also id. at 245–46.
357. Id. at 283–84, 320. Lanier’s proposal amounts to an extension of theories of privacy
rooted in control over information. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (discussing privacy in terms of “the individual’s control of
information concerning his or her person”); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 127 (2010) (describing the privacy
right as “a right to appropriate flow of personal information” (emphasis omitted)); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 24–29 (2008) (discussing the theory of privacy based on the
control of personal information).
358. LANIER, supra note 39, at 20.
359. Id. at 320.
360. Lanier’s price-setting scheme is less radical than it may first appear. The monetization
of privacy rights bears some similarity to civil damages lawsuits for constitutional violations. The
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Providing clarity and avoiding case-by-case litigation over what constitutes
a reasonable expectation of privacy are two benefits of Lanier’s system,
attributes that Kerr suggests support the third-party doctrine.361 But a loss of
nuanced judicial determinations and systematic acceptance of a base level of
government surveillance would be the cost of Lanier’s approach.
2. Legislating Data Ownership
The notion of interposing the individual between the government and
the third-party company as the owner of the data is not just theoretical.
Fourteen states currently establish that car owners and lessees own the data
that are stored and analyzed in their cars’ data recorders and navigation
systems.362 Federal legislation, known as the “Driver Privacy Act,” has also been
introduced that makes the owner or lessee of a car the owner of any data in
the car’s data recorder.363 The data might include every route driven, driving
habits, and speeding.364
The laws prohibit the sharing of this sort of information, except in
limited circumstances, absent the consent of the car owner.365 The data would
otherwise be construed under the third-party doctrine as non-content
information voluntarily turned over to third parties, such as Google or the
Ford Motor Company, thereby negating any Fourth Amendment expectation
of privacy by the driver. But the delineation of personal ownership rights, with
limits on its dissemination to others, should establish an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in those data from the government.
3. Automated Privacy Preferences
Because of the proliferation of Internet-related devices and their privacy
policies’ inscrutability, individuals cannot effectively control how private
companies collect and use their data.366 Transparency and user education are
critical to ensuring that individuals understand what corporations do with
their data. The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
has proposed that intermediary (yet another third party, now a fourth party)
Framers envisioned that the government-limiting objectives of the Fourth Amendment would be
realized through jury trial for trespass claims. See Ku, supra note 281, at 1338–39; supra Part V.C.1;
supra note 285 and accompanying text.
361. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 581–86.
362. Brian Naylor, Putting the Brake on Who Can See Your Car’s Data Trail, NPR (Jan. 22, 2014,
4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/01/22/264996671/putting-thebrake-on-who-can-see-your-cars-data-trail.
363. Driver Privacy Act, S. 1925, 113th Cong. (2014); see also TLJ Analysis of S 1925, the Driver
Privacy Act, TECH L.J. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2014/04
09b.asp (raising concerns over the exception’s lack of requirements concerning court
authorization of data retrieval, such as particularity and specificity of warrants).
364. Naylor, supra note 362.
365. Id.
366. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 38, 40.
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organizations might offer “privacy preference profiles” with which individuals
align.367 The intermediary groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union
or Consumer Reports, would vet tech companies and their products’ privacy
policies for protections of their particular interests, be they civil liberties or
economic value.368
Technological advancements may allow for an automated review of
privacy policies, ensuring that individuals only choose products and services
that comport with their privacy preference profiles.369 Such widespread and
automated advocacy is more likely to shift companies’ privacy policies so that
they comport with these profiles.370
4. Automated Big Data Popular Notice Regime
In the big data era, an individual cannot know all the data that private
corporations and the government have and what they do with it. Lessig
therefore concludes that “architecture must enable machine-to-machine
negotiations about privacy so that individuals can instruct their machines
about the privacy they want to protect.”371
Building on Lanier’s monetization of privacy rights and the privacy
preference profiles of the President’s Council may better realize the populist,
government-limiting objectives of the Fourth Amendment. Rather than
attaching a financial component to the data, I propose a regime in which
individuals would instead select in advance whether to receive notice when
the government requests their data from a third-party company. Instead of
setting a price for the data, an individual would choose what forms of data
collection and analysis would require notice.
The best route toward clarifying what data surveillance requires notice to
the individual user is through legislation. As the driver data ownership laws
suggest,372 Congress may decide what data merit a proprietary relationship
and, therefore, privacy protection. But any data about which Congress finds
that surveillance would implicate privacy concerns should require notice to
the individual, a cause of action for the individual, and limits on immunity
afforded tech companies. Even with congressional action, however,

367. Id. at 40–41.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 41. The envisioned process would require “formalisms to specify privacy policies
and tools to analyze software to determine conformance to those policies,” as well as expressive
policies and tests of adherence. Id.
370. Id. (“To attract market share, providers (especially smaller ones) could seek to qualify
their offerings in as many privacy-preference profiles, offered by as many different third parties,
as they deem feasible.”).
371. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 232; see also LANIER, supra note 39, at 362 (“[E]conomics must
become more and more about the design of the machines that mediate human social behavior.”).
372. See supra Part VI.C.2.
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unaddressed instances will arise that call into question whether the
government may obtain a person’s data.
A person’s notice profile would permit an individual selection of only
corporations’ services and devices that provide notice to the user upon
government requests for their data. A person might not want notice of every
request. An individual may deem inoffensive the collection of telephony
metadata for purposes of aggregate analysis and not request notice before
such collection. The collection of CSLI, on the other hand, might induce
concern and prompt a notice preference. Because, however, there may be
forms of data analysis, with resulting revelations about personal behavior or
conduct, that have yet to be discovered, general categories of data and analysis
should be included within a person’s notice profile.
Even without judicial or congressional endorsement of notice profiles,
the market could precipitate a move toward increased notice to the individual
user. As with general privacy preferences concerning the sale of one’s data to
particular private entities, individual preferences for notice could serve as an
adjunct to limiting government surveillance by prompting companies to
provide such notice to the users.
Notice also might be facilitated through future technological
developments such as Lanier’s proposed “Nelsonian network”—a two-way
system that would record the provenance of all data.373 The government
would know in advance when a person wants notice and the person would
receive notice each time the government seeks her data.374
These sorts of “machine-to-machine” communication of individual
preferences would permit the government to decide whether it would fight
for the acquisition of that specific individual’s data or whether the lack of the
information would not impair its investigation. If the government believes the
data are necessary, it would have two options: (1) provide notice to the user
and, in the event of the user’s opposition (or the company’s), litigate the data
acquisition in court; or (2) seek a warrant from the court authorizing the
surveillance without notice.
Courts may be burdened by more litigation brought by individual users
over government requests for their data. But statutory clarity through
legislation such as the Driver Privacy Act should guide the Executive and
Judicial branches in determining what level of protection particular kinds of
data require. Increased litigation is, however, the necessary cost of reinserting
the individual in the conversation and negotiation with the government over
her data. The Fourth Amendment must be first and foremost the people’s
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, not the right of the
corporation.

373.
374.

LANIER, supra note 39, at 227.
Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The viability of corporate avatars as an answer to the third-party
doctrine’s flaws nears a crossroads. The 2014 term witnessed the Supreme
Court’s growing recognition of privacy’s fragility in the big data era and its
continuing expansion of corporations’ rights. In Riley v. California, the Court
acknowledged big data’s encroachment on the Fourth Amendment, holding
that a cell phone search required a warrant due to the phone’s vast trove of
data and the intimate details that information might reveal.375 In Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court gave further scope to corporate rights,
holding that the government’s contraceptive mandate impermissibly
burdened a corporation’s free exercise of religion.376
The two lines of cases may ultimately intersect or collide. The Court will
have to confront corporate avatars and their legitimacy as guardians of the
Fourth Amendment. A more robust corporate Fourth Amendment right
might appear to strengthen corporations’ ability to resist government requests
for user data. The purpose of extending a constitutional right to a corporation
is, after all, as the Hobby Lobby majority held, to protect the rights of its people,
its members.377 But the many practical reasons set forth in this Article suggest
corporations are unlikely and unable to effectively challenge the government
in the majority of requests for their users’ data. Moreover, the Bill of Rights’
populist origins and the Framers’ distrust of corporate power militate against
the maintenance of the corporate avatar dynamic. Government surveillance
and use of big data will increasingly implicate an individual’s Fourth
Amendment right, requiring that she be permitted to challenge the
government.
To achieve the Fourth Amendment’s privacy and government oversight
objectives, individuals should normally receive notice of government
surveillance and acquisition of their data. Notice may be justified on a number
of grounds. First, the third-party doctrine should be limited to allow for
Fourth Amendment protection of non-content data and data that are now
indispensable to participate in society. Second, people should be afforded a
proprietary right in much of their data. Congress may extend that right to
various data, attaching to that right notice, as well as limits on incentives for
corporate acquiescence to government requests for individuals’ data. Finally,
people may communicate their desired privacy and notice to both
corporations and government through machine-to-machine technology,
affording some level of ex ante clarity to the government for surveillance and
pushing corporations to comport with individuals’ preferences. By so

375.
376.
377.

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
Id. at 2768.
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restoring agency to individuals in their relationship with the government, the
Fourth Amendment can become again “[t]he right of the people.”378

378.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

